Caches and hash trees for efficient memory integrity verification
By Blaise Gassend, G. Suh, Dwaine E. Clarke, Marten van Dijk, Srini Devadas. The Ninth International Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture, 2003. HPCA-9 2003. Proceedings., 2003
296 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Hardware and Architecture, Signal Processing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c24443b4e07413ff0ba1c1cac0d57855df30af67
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Srinath T. V. Setty
- Michael Walfish
- Eli Ben-Sasson
- Andrew Justin Blumberg
- Eran Tromer
- Madars Virza
- Srini Devadas
- Alessandro Chiesa
In Hardware and Architecture
- Srini Devadas
- G. Suh
- Victor Costan
- Roel Maes
- Yan Solihin
- Srinath T. V. Setty
- Eli Ben-Sasson
- Marcus Peinado
In Signal Processing
- Srini Devadas
- G. Suh
- Victor Costan
- Marcus Peinado
- Marten van Dijk
- Blaise Gassend
- Dwaine E. Clarke
- Andrew Baumann
Citations in the corpus
- Scalable Zero Knowledge Via Cycles of Elliptic Curves (2014, background): “Memory checking techniques have found numerous practical applications for securing untrusted storages [58,59,65,77,78].”
- Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven (2014, background): “Like other systems [16, 17, 26, 36, 62], a Merkle tree [42] protects the integrity of the overall disk.”
- AEGIS: architecture for tamper-evident and tamper-resistant processing (2003, background): “For a more detailed discussion of memory integrity verification, see [ 8 ] and [22].”
- Efficient memory integrity verification and encryption for secure processors (2003, methodology): “[ 9 ] shows how caching of internal nodes of the tree can significantly improve the performance of the scheme.”
- Improving Cost, Performance, and Security of Memory Encryption and Authentication (2006, background): “[4] employs authentication in which instructions are allowed to commit even before their data is completely authenticated [4].”
- Intel SGX Explained (2016, methodology): “Aegis was the first secure processor not vulnerable to physical replay attacks, as it uses a Merkle tree construction [57] to guarantee DRAM freshness.”
- Verifying computations with state (2013, methodology): “First, Pantry relies on Merkle trees [53] to authenticate a large untrusted memory, an idea used in theory [17] and in practice (for smartcards [30], databases [27, 49, 52], file systems [34, 43], etc.”