House Money Effects in Public Good Experiments
By Jeremy Clark. 2002
221 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c0f273d28d9a640e05a6208a49e5b0a58526ba0f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Olivier L’Haridon
- Jason F. Shogren
- Nathalie Etchart-Vincent
- L. Vranken
- Ting Jiang
- Abdolkarim Sadrieh
- Richard Deaves
- Todd L. Cherry
In General Decision Sciences
- Glenn W. Harrison
- Olivier L’Haridon
- Nathalie Etchart-Vincent
- Jason F. Shogren
- Stephan Kroll
- Abdolkarim Sadrieh
- Todd L. Cherry
- Klaus Abbink
In Safety Research
- Glenn W. Harrison
- Jason F. Shogren
- Stephan Kroll
- Olivier L’Haridon
- Nathalie Etchart-Vincent
- Abdolkarim Sadrieh
- Todd L. Cherry
- Klaus Abbink
Citations in the corpus
- House money effects in public good experiments: Comment (2007, methodology): “ Clark (2002) reports the average contributions in each round under each treatment, as shown in Fig. 1. Despite some differences, the averages look quite close.”
- Is Cheap Talk Effective at Eliminating Hypothetical Bias in a Provision Point Mechanism? (2005, unknown): “This is consistent with both Clark (2002) and List (2004) who found no evidence of found money effects in public goods experiments.”
- An experimental examination of the house money effect in a multi-period setting (2006, background): “However, in public good experiments, Clark (2002) reports no evidence of house money effects on peoples’ choices of voluntary contributions.”
- Monetary incentives in the loss domain and behavior toward risk: An experimental comparison of three reward schemes including real losses (2011, background): “Several studies actually support the house money effect (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Garling and Romanus 1997; Keasey and Moon 1996; Romanus et al. 1996; Thaler and Johnson 1990; Weber and Zuchel 2001; see however Clark 2002 for somewhat contradictory results, and Harrison 2007 for a critical discussio”
- The pleasure of being nasty (2009, background): “Note that because subjects had to work for their endowments, we also avoid the house-money effect (for an overview with mixed evidence see Clark (2002)).”
- Food Labeling and Eco-Friendly Consumption: Experimental Evidence From a Belgian Supermarket (2014, background): “The upward bias can be a result from a house money effect where the provision of an 407 initial endowment can cause experimental subjects to make unusual choices (Clark, 2002).”
- The Impact of Endowment Heterogeneity and Origin on Public Good Contributions: Evidence From the Lab (2005, background): “Some researchers find evidence that the origin of assets does not influence subject behavior in laboratory settings (e.g., Clark, 1998, 2002; Rutstr ¨ om and Williams, 2000; Ball et al., 2001).”