The Impact of Endowment Heterogeneity and Origin on Public Good Contributions: Evidence From the Lab
By Todd L. Cherry, Stephan Kroll, Jason F. Shogren. 2005
458 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cc4772fd75f4f219bf0c7bd209a10a6ff326ac09
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- Bertil Tungodden
- Alexander W. Cappelen
- Olof Johansson-Stenman
- Erik Ø. Sørensen
- F. Alpízar
- James Konow
- Glenn W. Harrison
- Fredrik Carlsson
In General Decision Sciences
- Bertil Tungodden
- Alexander W. Cappelen
- Erik Ø. Sørensen
- Olof Johansson-Stenman
- James Konow
- Glenn W. Harrison
- Fredrik Carlsson
- Benno Torgler
In Safety Research
- Bertil Tungodden
- Alexander W. Cappelen
- Erik Ø. Sørensen
- Olof Johansson-Stenman
- Fredrik Carlsson
- F. Alpízar
- James Konow
- Glenn W. Harrison
Citations in the corpus
- House money effects in public good experiments: Comment (2007, methodology): “2 Cherry, Kroll & Shogren (2005) examine similar issues in the context of a one-round public goods experiment.”
- Fair Air: Distributive Justice and Environmental Economics (2010, background): “ Cherry et al. (2005) find a similar tendency: high endowment subjects do not contribute proportionately more than low endowment subjects, but the former do contribute significantly more in absolute terms, suggesting that there is an attempt, on average, partially to offset differences in endowment”
- Responsibility for what? Fairness and individual responsibility (2010, background): “The importance of differences in individual endowments has also been studied in the context of ultimatum games, public-good games and redistributive voting games; see among others Cherry et al. (2005), Clark (1998), Durante and Putterman (2007), and Hoffman and Spitzer (1982).”
- Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations (2009, unknown): “(2002), and Cherry et al. (2005) nd that inequality leads to lower contributions, Chan et al. (1996) and Buckley”
- Anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity: Evidence from voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa Rica (2008, background): “In fact, Cherry et al. (2002) find that in a lab experiment, earned endowments substantially reduce offers in dictator games.”
- VOTING, PUNISHMENT, AND PUBLIC GOODS (2007, unknown): “In addition, recent experimental papers found significant differences in behavior and efficiency between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups (Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren 2005; Kroll, Cherry, and Shogren forthcoming; Margreiter, Sutter, and Dittrich 2005).”