Efficient Rent Seeking

By G. Tullock. 2001

2,451 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bfc3b1d83bd85b07ad186e872af4097f2c26789c

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Target Setting in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from China (2018, positive): “Secondly, we build our theoretical model of multi-layered tournament upon previous studies on tournament as an incentive scheme in a single-layered organization (Tullock, 1980; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey, 1983; Konrad, 2009).”
RECIPROCAL UPPER SEMICONTINUITY AND BETTER REPLY SECURE GAMES: A COMMENT (2006, methodology): “It is also used to model recruitment of talent, lotteries, advertisement, and patent races (Tullock (1980), Nitzan (1994), and Paul and Wilhite (1990)).”
SIMULTANEOUS DECISION‐MAKING IN COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTS (2013, positive): “contest is based on the theoretical model of Tullock (1980). In this contest, identical risk-”
The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking (2008, background): “…with an endowment of e$16 (“e$” being the experimental currency unit)—competed anonymously in a conventional symmetric Tullock rent-seeking game (see Tullock, 1980) by simultaneously choosing how many e$s to spend on contest tokens (any integer number between 0 and 16 was allowed, the cost of 1…”
Endowment Effects in Contests (2009, positive): “…expected payoff for player 𝑖, 𝐸(𝜋𝑖), can be written as 𝐸(𝜋𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖(𝑊 + 𝑉 − 𝑏𝑖) + (1 − 𝑝𝑖)(𝑊 − 𝑏𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖𝑉 − 𝑏𝑖 +𝑊. (2) Differentiating (2) with respect to 𝑏𝑖 and accounting for the symmetric Nash equilibrium leads to the classic solution (Tullock, 1980), 𝑏∗ = 𝑉(𝑁 − 1)/𝑁2.”
Economics of Conflict: An Overview (2006, methodology): “Sometimes referred to as the “power form” or as the “ratio form”, this functional form is that which was employed by Tullock (1980) and the ensuing voluminous literature on rent-seeking.”
Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum (2012, positive): “Following Tullock (1980), we have ).”
Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research (2015, neutral): “Since effort is used only for appropriation of the prize and not its production, higher effort is viewed as socially wasteful (Tullock, 1980).”
Corruption and Rent-Seeking (2002, background): “It is rational to invest in rent-seeking as long as the marginal input is smaller than the potential output it generates (Tullock, 1980b).”