RECIPROCAL UPPER SEMICONTINUITY AND BETTER REPLY SECURE GAMES: A COMMENT
By Adib Bagh, Alejandro Jofré. 2006
69 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bc7df6b40180a031cef040fa504a471b29325bbd
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Management Science and Operations Research
Citations in the corpus
- Understanding some recent existence results for discontinuous games (2011, background): “Part of the characterization relies on the notion of weak upper semicontinuity introduced by Bagh and Jofre (2006). A game G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous if for all (x, α) in the frontier of the graph of u, there exists i ∈ N and x̂i ∈ Xi such that ui(x̂i, x−i) > αi.”
- On equilibrium existence in payoff secure games (2011, background): “An important generalization of reciprocal upper semicontinuity is proposed by Bagh and Jofre (2006): A game G = (Xi , ui )n i=1 is weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous, if, for any (x, α) ∈ FrΓ (G), there are a player i and xi ∈ Xi such that ui (xi , x−i ) > αi .”
- Games With Discontinuous Payoffs: A Strengthening of Reny's Existence Theorem (2011, background): “) Largely in response to his work, a number of papers on discontinuous games have appeared recently (Carmona (2005); Bagh and Jofre (2006); Bich (2006, 2009); Monteiro and Page (2007); Carmona (2009); Carbonell-Nicolau (2011, 2010a,b); Prokopovych (2010a,b); Barelli and Soza (2009); de Castro (2011)”