Corruption and Rent-Seeking
By J. Lambsdorff. 2002
317 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2e442f22a4b9cf1880b78f8afad13f0d1edada2c
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
In Sociology and Political Science
- Toke S. Aidt
- Guglielmo Tosato
- Eugen Dimant
- Taner Güney
- Rajeev Kumar Goel
- Benjamin Powell
- Jac C. Heckelman
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon
Citations in the corpus
- Rent seeking and the economics of corruption (2016, background): “As emphasized by Lambsdorff (2002), this makes corruption, understood as influence-seeking activities from which officials personally benefit, particularly harmful to society: corruption possibilities encourage rent creation.”
- Entrepreneurship and second-best institutions: going beyond Baumol’s typology (2010, unknown): “12 Lambsdorff (2002) questions the validity of treating lobbying as equally wasteful as corruption.”