Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance reform: the case of Germany

By Anja Tuschke, W. G. Sanders. 2003

133 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bea26a0f01a657c013070f8ff6ad862e79844e1d

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Citations in the corpus

Principal—Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation (2008, background): “(Tuschke and Sanders, 2003) and bandwagon effects (Peng, 2004) working to determine the number of independent directors in a company.”
How boards’ internal and external social capital interact to affect firm performance (2016, methodology): “…and Winlund, 2000; Kiel and Nicholson, 2006; Pugliese and Wenstøp, 2007; Ruigrok et al., 2006), and is measured in our analysis by the logarithm of the firm’s total number of employees in the study’s reference year (He and Huang, 2011; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Tuschke and Sanders, 2003).”
Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, unknown): “Taking the opposite approach, Tuschke and Sanders (2003) examined divestitures following the voluntary adoption of stock-based incentive plans in German public firms.”
Comparative and International Corporate Governance (2010, background): “For instance, Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005), Buck and Shahrim (2005), Djelic (1998), P.C. Fiss and Zajac (2004), and Tuschke and Sanders (2003) have shown that when corporate governance practices, particularly those tied to shareholder value ideology, are exported from the United States to other…”
Incentive Mechanisms, Entrepreneurial Orientation, and Technology Commercialization: Evidence from China's Transitional Economy* (2007, unknown): “The ownership gets used to align the CEOs with that of shareholders (Li, Sun, and Liu, 2006; Tuschke and Sanders, 2003).”
Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical Review and Future Directions (2009, unknown): “, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004) and various outsider- or market-oriented practices such as independent directors, stock-based executive compensation, and greater corporate information disclosure (Tuschke and Sanders, 2003; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Markarian, Parbonetti and Previts, 2007; Sanders a”
Ownership, strategic orientation and internationalization in emerging markets (2011, methodology): “Using the criterion developed by Tuschke and Sanders (2003), we measured CEO ownership by the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the CEO.”