The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought

By Peter Carruthers. 2006

539 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/be66125b7f64c1d4bf0e0288cc8ad2c5037818c1

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In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

Citations in the corpus

Alief in Action (and Reaction) (2008, unknown): “(For related discussion, cf. Dennett, 1987; Carruthers 2006, manuscript .)”
Mindreading in Infancy (2013, background): “While some scientists have probably thought of the two systems as being wholly distinct, existing alongside one another in the human mind, such an idea has come under increasing pressure (Frankish, 2004, 2009; Carruthers, 2006, 2009).”
Neuroscience and the Multiple Realization of Cognitive Functions* (2010, background): “This is modularity without the usual bells and whistles (Fodor 1983; Carruthers 2006).”
Natural Agency: The Case of Bacterial Cognition (2017, background): “One might object that while Descartes characterizes ‘central’ cognitive capacities (reason) as domain-general, recent studies in cognitive science suggest that they might be domain-specific (Carruthers 2006).”
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition (2013, unknown): “…that have been posited by evolutionary psychologists; processes of implicit learning; and the automatic firing of overlearned associations (see H. C. Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Carruthers, 2006; Evans, 2008; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Samuels, 2005, 2009; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Sperber, 1994).”
The duality of mind: an historical perspective (2009, background): “The neuropsychological evidence appears to us to be conclusive on this point, strongly supported by evolutionary arguments for multiple memory systems (Carruthers 2006; Sherry and Schacter 1987).”
Neural reuse: A fundamental organizational principle of the brain (2010, background): “Can cognitive functions be independent when they have overlapping neural implementations? Questions about what functional modularity requires are vexed, and different researchers have come to many different conclusions on the matter (Barrett & Kurzban 2006; Carruthers 2006).”
The evolved apprentice. How evolution made humans unique (2012, background): “…For more recent understandings of the modularity hypothesis and for possible challenges to Sterelny's criticism of modularity, see Machery (2007) and Carruthers (2006). the human evolutionary trajectory because it is richly posed to explain competent response to complex evolutionary challenges.”
Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (2015, unknown): “…worry that his two main reasons for taking the GNW hypothesis to be an attractive theory are not unique to the architecture of the GNW. Levy follows Carruthers (2006) in believing that the brain is massively modular and that it ‘does not seem well designed for domain-general information…”
Systems and levels: Dual-system theories and the personal- subpersonal distinction ∗ (2009, background): “One possible mechanism is autostimulation: conclusions articulated in inner speech might be processed by the speech comprehension system and interpreted as instructions or reports, which are then adopted as intentions or beliefs in subpersonal reasoning (Carruthers 2006, ch.6, this volume.)”
Intuitive and Reflective Inferences (2008, background): “At first blush, dual process theories also stand in contrast to massively modular views of human cognition (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Carruthers, 2006; Sperber, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).”
Varieties of cognitive penetration in visual perception. (2014, unknown): “Along similar lines, Carruthers makes an extensive argument for the massive modularity of the mind (Carruthers, 2006) including perception (at least early visual processes) as being implemented as an impenetrable module.”
Modularity of Mind (2017, background): “…system is weakly modular in the sense that it is not composed of encapsulated or domain-specific sub-systems (Carruthers 2006; Colombo 2013, 359; Robbins 2015; see also Barrett and Kurzban 2006; Carruthers 2006; Coltheart 1999; Tooby and Cosmides 1992; Pinker 2003; Sperber and Hirschfeld 2006).”
What is moral reasoning? (2015, background): “[17] On the assumption that all such domains of reasoning are subserved by the identical set of psychological processes, which is itself a substantive claim (Carruthers, 2006).”
The illusion of conscious will (2007, background): “The mind-reading system’s model of the architecture of the mind as a whole is highly simplified, but nevertheless accurate enough for most everyday purposes of prediction and explanation (Carruthers, 2006).”