Consciousness and Moral Responsibility

By Dennis Patterson. Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 2015

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On 18 June 2014, Justin Ross Harris found the lifeless body of his 22-month-old son inside his car, which he left parked all day at more than 928. Although he claims to have been completely unaware of the fact that his son was in the car, many think Harris is still responsible for his son’s death, and he now faces up to 20 years in jail. These kinds of cases, in which an agent is unaware of an action – or of the reasons behind an action – but nonetheless is held responsible for it, have motivated several philosophers to reject the Consciousness Thesis (CT): ‘the thesis that consciousness of at least some of the facts that give our actions or omissions their moral significance is a necessary condition of moral responsibility’ (vii). Neil Levy disagrees, and in the six chapters that compose Consciousness and Moral Responsibility he mounts a clear, forceful and compelling argument to defend CT. One of the many virtues of this impressive volume is its brevity. For that reason, many of Levy’s assertions are underdeveloped. My hope in this note is to offer a number of observations pertaining empirical claims that could be refined and revised, without necessarily altering the gist of the argument, to improve upon what is already a persuasive view. Levy begins, in Chapter 1, by summarizing two kinds of arguments that have motivated the denial of CT. On the one hand, some arguments deny CT based on scientific evidence suggesting that we are often unconscious of the reasons why we act but are nonetheless held responsible. On the other hand, some arguments deny CT based on the description of ordinary cases and folk practices, which allegedly provide philosophical reasons to deny CT. Although brief, the discussion here does a good job explaining the grounds upon which some philosophers deny CT. But what are these philosophers denying?

Subfields: General Health Professions

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