Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? Governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany

By Erik E. Lehmann, Jürgen G Weigand. 2000

447 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bd839210894bd1d3e947ec860b0bda1e879058ea

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Lammertjan Dam
2. Gary Gang Tian
3. Tianpei Luo
4. U. Hege
5. Francis Bloch
6. Qigui Liu
7. Bert Scholtens
8. O. Weber

In Finance

1. Lammertjan Dam
2. Bert Scholtens
3. Gary Gang Tian
4. Tianpei Luo
5. U. Hege
6. Francis Bloch
7. Qigui Liu
8. O. Weber

Citations in the corpus

• Entrepreneurial Access and Absorption of Knowledge Spillovers: Strategic Board and Managerial Composition for Competitive Advantage (2006, unknown): “The second tier consists of the board of directors, which represents members whose task is to control the managers, inform financiers, and provide advice to the managers (Frick and Lehmann 2005; Lehmann and Weigand 2000).”
• Does Ownership Type Matter for Corporate Social Responsibility (2012, background): “Many researchers have investigated the effect of the type of shareholders on companies (see Coffey & Fryxell, 1991; David et al., 2007; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Lehmann & Weigand, 2000; Neubaum & Zahra, 2006).”
• Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China (2015, background): “Lehman and Weigand (2000) and Maury and Pajuste (2005) find that having strong second largest shareholders enhances profitability in European firms, while Faccio et al. (2001) find that MLS reduces expropriations in Europe and increases expropriations in Asia where the corporate governance and…”
• Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests (2003, background): “Consistent with this hypothesis, Lehmann and Weigand (2000) report that, in a regression of ownership variables on return on assets for German stock-listed companies, “the presence of a strong second or third large shareholder enhances profitability.””
• Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations (2007, unknown): “Lehmann and Weigand (2000) show that the existence of a second large owner is positively associated with the profitability of German firms.”
• European Takeover Regulation (2003, unknown): “See Lehman and Weigand (2000), Volpin (2002), Faccio et al. (2001) for empirical evidence of such mechanisms. incumbent managers.”
• Multiple large shareholders, excess leverage and tunneling: evidence from an emerging market (2017, unknown): “The studies of Lehman and Weigand (2000), Maury and Pajuste (2005), Laeven and Levine (2008); Attig et al. (2009) and Luo et al. (2012) have rendered support by indicating that the presence of other multiple large shareholders with relative significant voting power is associated to a valuable…”