Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests

By Francis Bloch, U. Hege. 2003

144 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5f478aecdf7fa763e5f52f75f2b085b02e3a4ca5

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Citations in the corpus

Sharing of Control versus Monitoring as Corporate Governance Mechanisms (2006, unknown): “, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Kahn and Winton (1998), Bloch and Hege (2001), and Noe (2002)).”
Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity (2015, background): “They can also limit the potential for expropriation of minority shareholders through competition for corporate control (Bloch and Hege, 2001).”
Corporate Governance and Control (2003, unknown): “…setting he shows that one of the roles of a large blockholding is to fend off alliances of smaller blockholders that might compete for control [see also Gomes and Novaes (2000) and Bloch and Hege (2000) for two other recent formal analyses of ownership structures with multiple large shareholders].”
Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders (2011, background): “…contests (Dhillon and Rossetto 2009) or extract private benefits (Zwiebel 1995; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 2000; Mueller and Wärneryd 2001; Bloch and Hege 2003; Maury and Pajuste 4In Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Calcagno and Heider (2008) and Ferreira, Ferreira and Raposo (2010), price efficiency…”
Control Structures and Payout Policy (2007, unknown): “Examples of measures used in the literature include Banzhaf indices (Banzhaf, 1965; Dubey and Shapley, 1979), different versions of Shapley values (Shapley and Shubik, 1954; Milnor and Shapley, 1978), and contestability indices (Bloch and Hege, 2001).”