European Takeover Regulation

By Erik Berglöf, Mike Burkart. 2003

112 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c2647fb3f1a7e55b9a8e9e7c9717c79836ba4165

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Luc Renneboog
2. M. Martynova
3. M. Goergen
4. S. Lee
5. Mike Burkart
6. Sadok El Ghoul

In Strategy and Management

1. Luc Renneboog
2. M. Martynova
3. M. Goergen
4. Mike Burkart

Citations in the corpus

• Corporate Governance Convergence : Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe (2005, methodology): “However, Berglöf and Burkart (2003) argue that the rule fundamentally alters the initial contracts of the controlling owners resulting in uncertainty about property rights, and thus reducing the incentives of the controlling owners to invest in corporate governance actions.”
• One Share - One Vote: The Theory (2007, background): “Under the one share - one vote structure, these costs do not only constrain 18Both sides of ownership concentration are well documented in numerous empirical studies, but the evidence is inconclusive on whether the positive or negative e¤ects dominate (Becht et al., 2003; Berglöf and Burkart, 2003.)”