Undermining trust and cooperation : The paradox of sanctioning systems in social dilemmas
By L. Mulder, Eric van Dijk, David de Cremer, Henk A. M. Wilke. 2006
277 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bd06828f701ea39063004f0e605b8da56662e32f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Safety Research
- Robb Willer
- Michel J. J. Handgraaf
- Sandra Polanía-Reyes
- Nam Phong Le
- Samuel Bowles
- Kirstin C Appelt
- Dajian Zhu
- T. Nguyen
In Sociology and Political Science
- Robb Willer
- E. Penz
- Thomas Sabitzer
- S. Marth
- Sandra Polanía-Reyes
- Nam Phong Le
- Michel J. J. Handgraaf
- Samuel Bowles
Citations in the corpus
- Factors influencing waste separation intention of residential households in a developing country: Evidence from Hanoi, Vietnam (2015, background): “However, regarding sanctioning systems in social dilemmas, Mulder et al. (2006) showed negative effects of sanctions when it undermined trust that others are internally motivated to co-operate.”
- Zeileis Conditional Variable Importance for Random Forests (2015, background): “The use of control and punishment could strengthen the assumption that others act in their own self-interest, which could undermine initial trust in others [63].”
- Economic incentives and social preferences: substitutes or complements? (2012, background): “See Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a, 2000b) and Mulder et al. (2006). Categorical crowding out.”
- Public Praise vs. Private Pay: Effects of Rewards on Energy Conservation in the Workplace (2013, background): “In some cases, the cessation of external reinforcement can even lead to lower than baseline levels of the desired behavior (Mulder et al., 2006).”
- Beyond Altruism: Sociological Foundations of Cooperation and Prosocial Behavior (2015, unknown): “These sanctions can also reduce interpersonal trust by introducing ambiguity about why others are contributing to group goals (Mulder et al. C a m pu s (Anderson & Willer 2014, Gambetta & Przepiorka 2014, Willer et al. 2014a).”
- Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice: The Status Solution to the Collective Action Problem (2009, background): “Indeed, recent research shows that formal sanctions can undermine trust and altruism between group members (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Mulder et al. 2006).”