On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design

By Aviad Heifetz, Zvika Neeman. 2006

128 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d7857211e10cb5b7f4cfbdd34a421ab6c4d6ac64

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Jonathan Weinstein
2. Jeffrey C. Ely
3. Ichiro Obara
4. Muhamet Yildiz
5. Kim-Sau Chung

In Marketing

1. Ichiro Obara
2. Kim-Sau Chung

In Safety Research

1. Jonathan Weinstein
2. Ichiro Obara

Citations in the corpus

• Optimal Auctions with Ambiguity (2004, background): “(See for example Bergemann and Morris [1], Ely and Chung [6], and Heifetz and Neeman [11]).”
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements (2007, background): “…some central findings in economics, such as the full surplus extraction property of Cremer and Mclean (1988) in mechanism design (Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006)) and the Coase conjecture in bargaining (Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2005)), crucially rely on the assumptions on the…”
• The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions (2006, background): “In fact Heifetz and Neeman [18] show that the set of priors on a universal type space which allows FSE is “small” in a certain sense.22 My results are complementary to theirs because they show that FSE can fail even in a naive type space.”
• Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms (2007, background): “These and similar issues have been raised in Neeman (2004), Bergemann and Morris (2005), Heifetz and Neeman (2006) , Morris (2002), Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (forthcoming) and Weinstein and Yildiz (2004).”