Putting Firms into Optimal Tax Theory

By W. Kopczuk, Joel B. Slemrod. 2006

172 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Gender Studies

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bc5a383d907c793b51d1645234f44723466340b7

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Gender Studies

Citations in the corpus

Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement (2017, background): “…auditing (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) toward a focus on “thirdparty information”: the ability to verify taxpayer reports against other sources, such as an employer report of salary or the report of a firm’s trading partners (e.g., Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006; Kleven et al., 2010; Pomeranz, 2013).”
Why Can Modern Governments Tax so Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries (2016, background): “Second, Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006) set out a simple model to show how the network of firm-to-firm arm-length transactions can help the government enforce taxation.”
Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance (2018, unknown): “Recent theoretical studies argue that this can be explained by the additional deterrence effect implied by third-party information reporting (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006; Gordon and Li, 2009; Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2015).”
No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax (2015, unknown): “The key assumption behind the notion that “self-enforcement” breaks down at the retail stage is that all else equal, the cost of evasion will be lower at that point than in the middle of the production chain because firm N is not faced by a firm N + 1 that would want a receipt.”
Unwilling or unable to cheat? evidence from a randomized tax audit experiment in Denmark (2010, background): “This also suggests that more work is needed in building a tax enforcement theory that centers on third-party reporting by firms (Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2009) and to explore the role of firms in tax systems more generally (Gordon and Li, 2005; Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006).”
Do IRS Audits Deter Corporate Tax Avoidance (2012, methodology): “26 Further, Larcker and Rusticus (2009) and Francis and Lennox (2010) stress that corrections for endogeneity that is only potentially a problem routinely generate estimates that are inferior to those obtained by simply using standard ordinary least squares.”