Do IRS Audits Deter Corporate Tax Avoidance

By Jeffrey L. Hoopes, Devan Mescall, Jeffrey A. Pittman. 2012

497 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5b357ac7bc73052a788beb581bf158a5a4c79260

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Citations in the corpus

Incentives for Tax Planning and Avoidance: Evidence from the Field (2014, result): “This result is related to prior work that finds that IRS scrutiny discourages tax avoidance (Hoopes, Mescall, and Pittman 2012; Mills and Sansing 2000; Mills 1998, 1996).”
Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior (2016, unknown): “18 that are potentially associated with firms’ tax planning activities, including Leverage, Intangibles, Inventory Intensity, R&D Intensity, Capital Intensity, and Capex (Chen et al. 2010; Hoopes et al. 2012; Hanlon et al. 2014).”
The Effects of Regulatory Scrutiny on Tax Avoidance: An Examination of SEC Comment Letters (2016, background): “Also, the prior literature suggests that a firm’s tax positions can be an opening bid in a strategic game of IRS audit adjustments (Slemrod 2007; Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian 2001; Hoopes et al. 2012).”
Does Tax Risk Affect Investor Valuation of Tax Avoidance? (2017, background): “Other research suggests that unlike other expenses, taxes are monitored by third parties (Hoopes et al., 2012), and tax avoidance can be a potential ‘‘hot button’’ issue if investors perceive firms as failing to pay their ‘‘fair share’’ (Dyreng et al.”
Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior (2016, unknown): “Tax executives of large corporations report that: 12 percent of tax positions could be changed with one month; 39.6 percent within six months; and nearly 70 percent within one year, suggesting that tax avoidance changes within one year seem plausible [Hoopes et al. 2012].”
Customer-Supplier Relationships and Corporate Tax Avoidance (2017, background): “Hoopes, Mescall, and Pittman (2012) find that stricter tax enforcement by IRS reduces corporate tax avoidance.”
The Effect of Tax Authority Monitoring and Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality (2014, unknown): “Specifically, prior research finds that tax enforcement reduces incentives to understate taxable income (Hoopes et al. 2012), which is likely to reduce any downward bias in earnings due to the effect of conforming accruals.”
The Role of Managerial Ability in Corporate Tax Avoidance (2017, unknown): “Indirect costs include political costs, reputation concerns, financial reporting effects, and increased IRS and financial statement auditor scrutiny (e.g., Zimmerman 1983, Graham et al. 2014, Mills 1998, Frank et al. 2009, Hoopes et al. 2012).”
Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness (2013, unknown): “7 Consistent with tax enforcement impacting managers’ incentives to avoid taxes, Hoopes et al. (2012) find that the IRS tax audit rate is negatively associated with corporate tax avoidance.”
Home Country Tax System Characteristics and Corporate Tax Avoidance: International Evidence (2012, background): “When the probability of a tax audit is higher, Hanlon et al. (2011) find that accrual quality is higher and Hoopes et al. (2011) find that public firms take less aggressive tax positions.”