No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax
By Dina Pomeranz. 2015
756 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1eeb725e558a2415a87cd3ecd661669b8e8d8ba0
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Jeffrey L. Hoopes
- L. Castro
- Lucie Gadenne
- J. De Neve
- B. K. Jack
- Jonathan L. Weigel
- Michael Greenstone
- Joel B. Slemrod
In Economics and Econometrics
- Jonathan L. Weigel
- Jeffrey L. Hoopes
- L. Castro
- Carlos Scartascini
- Johannes Spinnewijn
- B. Collins
- Michael Sebastiani
- Daniel H. Reck
Citations in the corpus
- Does Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve Small-Business Tax Compliance? (2017, background): “21 This behavior was also found by Pomeranz (2013) in a very different setting.”
- Envirodevonomics: A Research Agenda for an Emerging Field (2015, background): “While substantial theoretical literatures describe each in isolation (see Stiglitz (1989); De Janvry et al.”
- How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-Wide Experiments in Belgium (2019, background): “Slemrod, and M. G. Smith (2001). Do normative appeals affect tax compliance? evidence from a controlled experiment in minnesota. National Tax Journal , 125–138. Bott, K. M., A. W. Cappelen, E. Sorensen, and B. Tungodden (2017). You’ve got mail: a randomised field experiment on tax evasion. Departmen”
- WHAT MOTIVATES TAX COMPLIANCE? (2018, neutral): “…Reckers, and Sanders (2010), Kleven et al. (2011), Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler (2013), Gangl et al. (2014), Castro and Scartascini (2015), Pomeranz (2015), Dwenger et al. (2016), Jacobsen and Piovesan (2016), and have a “spillover” effect, or an increase in compliance independent of…”
- Tax Compliance and Enforcement in the Pampas: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2013, methodology): “, 2011), VAT (Pomeranz, 2013), or very specific fees (Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler, 2013).”
- Shaming tax delinquents (2015, neutral): “…can be increased by a range of policies, such as auditing (Slemrod et al., 2001); third-party reporting (Kleven et al., 2011); paper trails (Pomeranz, 2015); cross-checking (Bø et al., 2015; Carrillo et al., 2017; Drago et al., 2011; Naritomi, 2015); and satellite detection of unregistered…”
- From the Lab to the Field: A Review of Tax Experiments (2016, neutral): “Other differences regard the presentation of treatment messages within the tax bill (Castro and Scartascini, 2013) or, as in most cases, as a separate letter; as well as the tax types considered, such as VAT (Pomeranz, 2015), personal income taxes (Bott et al.”
- Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance (2018, neutral): “The complementarity result reveals the positive impact of information flows through the production chain on tax compliance in line with the results obtained by De Paula and Scheinkman (2010) and Pomeranz (2015) in developing economies.”