Why Can Modern Governments Tax so Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries

By H. Kleven, C. Kreiner, Emmanuel Saez. 2016

349 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/250eb2ad5f116c357c8fae3caf985e5863ec9f49

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Citations in the corpus

Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance (2018, neutral): “Recent theoretical studies argue that this can be explained by the additional deterrence effect implied by third-party information reporting (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006; Gordon and Li, 2009; Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2015).”
How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-Wide Experiments in Belgium (2019, positive): “The growth in third-party reporting of income has limited the ability to misreport income (see Kleven et al. 2011; Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez 2016; Jensen 2019).1 Tax administrations, however, continue to devote considerable resources to the collection of taxes.”
Unwilling or unable to cheat? evidence from a randomized tax audit experiment in Denmark (2010, background): “This also suggests that more work is needed in building a tax enforcement theory that centers on third-party reporting by firms (Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2009) and to explore the role of firms in tax systems more generally (Gordon and Li, 2005; Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006).”
Housing Market Responses to Transaction Taxes: Evidence From Notches and Stimulus in the U.K (2018, background): “Such evasion collusion involving many agents is unlikely to be sustainable (Kleven et al. 2009).”
Taking State-Capacity Research to the Field: Insights from Collaborations with Tax Authorities (2019, positive): “One key source of information in this context is “third-party reporting” (e.g. Kopczuk and Slemrod 2006, Gordon & Li 2009, Kleven et al. 2016).”
Taxation and Development (2013, background): “More employment takes place in legally registered firms rather than self-employment, as stressed by Kleven et al. (2009), and more financial transactions take place via formal intermediaries (such as banks), as stressed by Gordon and Li (2009).”
The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics (2009, neutral): “A long tradition in political science (for example, Arend Lijphart 1999) considers proportional electoral systems more consensual than majoritarian systems, while Persson, Gerard Roland, and Tabellini (2000) argue that parliamentary democracies are more representative than presidential democracies.”