Unwilling or unable to cheat? evidence from a randomized tax audit experiment in Denmark

By H. Kleven, Marte Knudsen, C. Kreiner, Søren Pedersen, Emmanuel Saez. 2010

165 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fe3c7baa3e31f75b3ff721b734ff991f703ab678

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Citations in the corpus

Shaming tax delinquents (2015, unknown): “, 2001); third-party reporting (Kleven et al., 2011); paper trails (Pomeranz, 2015); cross-checking (Bø et al.”
Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program (2016, unknown): “First, a recent set of studies uses microdata to shed light on enforcement technologies such as third-party reporting (Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian 2001; Saez 2010; Kleven et al. 2011; Chetty, Friedman, and Saez 2013; Naritomi 2015), paper trails (Kumler, Verhoogen, and Frı́as 2015; Pomeranz 2”
Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: lessons from theory, experiments, and field studies (2012, background): “4 Other researchers have conducted controlled field experiments (Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian, 2001; Iyer, Reckers, and Sanders 2010; Kleven et al., 2010).”
On the External Validity of Laboratory Tax Compliance Experiments (2015, unknown): “One of the first of these field experiments was by Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian (2001); more recent examples include Iyer, Reckers, and Sanders (2010), Kleven et al. (2011), Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler (2011), Pomeranz (2013), and Castro and Scartascini (2013), and Bott et al. (2013).”
Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records (2011, unknown): “Kleven et al. (2010) uncover substantial tax evasion among the self-employed and estimate that 40% of the bunchingat thetopkinkis drivenbytaxevasion.”
TESTING ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE FIELD: THREAT, MORAL APPEAL AND SOCIAL INFORMATION (2013, background): “In a recent study, Kleven et al. (2011) sent letters to a random sample of Danish taxpayers, who were informed that their tax returns would be audited (with certainty or with a chance of 50%).”
No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax (2015, background): “[23] Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, Martin Knudsen, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, Søren Lønstrup Pedersen, and Emmanuel Saez.”
Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence From a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark (2011, methodology): “This suggests that bunching is achieved partly by underdeclaring income, which is consistent with”
Consumers as Tax Auditors (2019, methodology): “Similarly to Kleven et al. (2011), I assume that the audit probability is increasing in the amount evaded, and that the probability governments detect evasion is a product of government audits and the likelihood that the government will uncover evasion by taxpayers during an audit.”
Tax Compliance and Enforcement (2018, unknown): “Kleven et al. (2011) conduct a similar audit experiment in Denmark.”
Evidence of the invisible: toward a credibility revolution in the empirical analysis of tax evasion and the informal economy (2012, background): “Kleven et al. (2010) designed a recent experiment in collaboration with the Danish tax collection agency.”