The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting

By Jennifer E. Bethel, Stuart L. Gillan. 2002

236 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b9d03c3052170f07fe52c4ab0e799839b3457630

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Citations in the corpus

Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: Evidence from Option Backdating (2012, methodology): “The large average effect of the RiskMetrics‘ recommendations observed in Model (2) is consistent with earlier studies of shareholder votes (Bethel and Gillan, 2002; Cai et al., 2009; Choi et al., 2009; Ertimur et al., 2011), raising the question of whether shareholders mechanically follow proxy advi”
Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance (2010, background): “…shares authorized for future issuance, receive lower support, although this may occur because plans with dilution of 5% or more of outstanding shares have been classified by stock exchanges as “non-routine” items that cannot be supported by the broker-vote, as discussed by Bethel & Gillan (2002).”
Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms (2015, background): “Similarly, Bethel and Gillan (2002) and Cai, Garner, and Walking (2009) find that a negative ISS recommendation on a management proposal can sway between 13.6% to 20.6% and 19% of votes, respectively. Prior research clearly establishes a strong association between negative recommendations by proxy a”
Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay (2013, unknown): “This 4 For example, the effect of ISS’s recommendations has been estimated at 14-21% for management proposals (Bethel and Gillan 2002), between 13% and 30% for director elections, depending on the context and time period (Cai et al., suggests that mandatory say on pay, by requiring costly analyses…”
The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design (2016, unknown): “11 See, e.g., Alexander et al. (2010), Bethel and Gillan (2002), Cai, Garner, and Walking (2009), Morgan association between recommendations and vote outcomes might not be causal and might be explained by shareholders and ISS independently reaching the same conclusions and/or by ISS being in…”
Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund (2009, unknown): “21 Bethel and Gillan (2007) conduct a clinical study of the Relational Investor Fund, a fund that engages US companies, and has a partnership agreement with the HUKFF, as well as a similar investment strategy.”
Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview (2006, background): “Others examine shareholder oversight of compensation by focusing on shareholder voting on compensation-related proxy proposals (Bethel and Gillan (2002), Ferri, Markarain, and Sandino (2005), Morgan and Poulsen (2001), and Morgan, Poulsen and Wolf (2005)).”
Rating the Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings? (2010, methodology): “Note that the coefficients on the ISS recommendation indicator variable are consistent with prior work, such as Bethel and Gillan (2002).”
Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay (2011, methodology): “Previous studies show that voting recommendations by influential proxy voting services have a significant effect on shareholder votes (e.g., Bethel and Gillan 2002; Cai et al. 2009).”