Institution formation in public goods games

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Voting on Punishment Systems Within a Heterogeneous Group (2011, background): “Kosfeld et al. (2008) have a similar finding that as long as there is no provision of a binding commitment, cooperation itself is difficult to attain.”
Domestic Politics and the Formation of International Environmental Agreements (2012, background): “Since the basic theory does not perform especially well in experimental conditions, such papers have been notable for introducing behavioural factors like perceptions of fairness (Dannenberg, 2012; Kosfeld et al., 2009; Tavoni et al., 2011), thus broadening the set of motivations assumed to act on t”
Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence (2015, methodology): “Nearly all established cartels in AA (91%), LEN (99%) and RD (97%) involve all rms in the market.(29) Whereas cartels are more often reported in LEN (7%) compared to RD (4%) where ringleaders are discriminated against.”
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “Where things stood circa 1995 Ledyard (1995) starts by providing an overview of the extant experimental literature on public goods games till the mid 1990s starting with the influential early work undertaken in the area by Bohm (1972, 1983) as well by Robyn Dawes and John Orbell and their”