Behind organizational slack and firm performance in China: The moderating roles of ownership and competitive intensity

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How researchers see this paper

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Theories of the (state-owned) firm (2016, background): “Not surprisingly, SOEs are characterized by significant slack, waste, and, in the worst case, abuse (Ju & Zhao, 2009; Stan, Peng, & Bruton, 2014; Tan & Peng, 2003; Xu, Yang, Quan, & Lu, 2015).11 Because of such monitoring problems, some SOEs may pursue their own interests, which deviate from the…”
CEO duality, organizational slack, and firm performance in China (2010, methodology): “Specifically, we follow Ju and Zhao (2009) and Su et al. (2009) to use newer and different data to replicate earlier work on the slack-performance link, and we extend it by developing an integrative framework.”
Ownership of Corporations (2016, background): “…(e.g., Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003, reported that less than 10% of the studies dealt with endogeneity), more should be done: For example, it is possible to find that some relationships (e.g., SOE to ROA) whose effect sizes change in the presence of endogeneity (Ju & Zhao, 2009; Le & O’Brien, 2010).”
Corporate governance and Asian companies (2011, background): “The absence of market discipline allows slack and inefficiency to persist in many Asian companies (Ju & Zhao, 2009; Peng, Li, Xie, & Su, 2010b).”