Heuristics and Biases: Support Theory: A Nonextensional Representation of Subjective Probability
By Amos Tversky, Derek J. Koehler. 2002
1,028 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: General Decision Sciences, History and Philosophy of Science, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b4f241655266ee120e875e0c9312b46b00b4aedd
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In General Decision Sciences
- George Loewenstein
- David E. Over
- Mike Oaksford
- Jack B. Soll
- John G. Lynch
- Elke U. Weber
- Gijs van de Kuilen
- Jean Baratgin
In History and Philosophy of Science
- Anthony OʼHagan
- J. Neil Bearden
- C. Starmer
- Gordon D. A. Brown
- Jerome R. Busemeyer
- Jean Baratgin
- N. Chater
- David A. Hensher
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Gal Zauberman
- Jack B. Soll
- Mike Oaksford
- Albert E. Mannes
- M. Kynn
- George Loewenstein
- Daniel Kahneman
- N. Chater
Citations in the corpus
- Assigning Membership in a Fuzzy Set Analysis (2005, methodology): “There are also direct scaling procedures such as the “staircase method” that generate uncertainty estimates as a by-product of the elicitation process (Cornsweet 1962; Tversky and Koehler 1994).”
- Attribute Processing, Heuristics, and Preference Construction in Choice Analysis (2009, background): “The Dempster-Shafer theory of belief has links to support theory (Tversky and Koehler 1994, Fox and Tversky 1998, Idson et al. 2001, Hensher 2009), a psychological model of degree of belief, which argues that different descriptions of the same event often give rise to systematically different…”
- A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality. (2003, methodology): “In one of the studies reported by Tversky and Koehler (1994), participants rated the probability that the home team would win in each of 20 specified basketball games and later provided ratings of the relative strength of the two teams, using a scale in which the strongest team in the tournament…”
- Prospect Theory and the Brain (2009, background): “Judged probabilities are assumed to accord with support theory (Tversky and Koehler, 1994; Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997), a behavioral model that conceives of judged probability as the proportion of support that a person associates with a focal hypothesis (for example, the Lakers will win)…”
- Bonus of rebate?: the impact of income framing on spending and saving (2006, background): “One of psychology’s most basic insights is that the evaluation of objects is based heavily on descriptions of objects rather than simply on objective features of the objects themselves ( Tversky & Koehler, 1994 ).”
- Future thought and behaviour change (2012, background): “High expectations of success might have facilitated positive fantasies (Klinger, 1977), and positive fantasies might have raised respective expectations of success (Anderson & Godfrey, 1987; summary by Tversky & Koehler, 1994).”
- A quantum theoretical explanation for probability judgment errors. (2011, background): “Support theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994) was designed to explain the first (subadditivity), but it cannot explain the second (superadditivity).”
- The ‘heuristics and biases’ bias in expert elicitation (2007, background): “but asking for frequencies rather than probabilities reduces this tendency (Tversky and Koehler, 1994; Sanbonmatsu et al., 1997).”
- A violation of the monotonicity axiom: experimental evidence on the conjunction fallacy (2000, background): “While Gigerenzer (1991) argued that the fallacy disappears in judgments of frequency rather than probability, the data reviewed by Tversky and Koehler (1994) suggests a decrease but not a disappearance of the fallacy.”