Incentive Schemes, Sorting and Behavioral Biases of Employees: Experimental Evidence

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Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda (2019, background): “Numerous papers have documented the presence and the role of overconfidence and optimism on workers’ beliefs and behavior (e.g., Hoffman 2014; Larkin and Leider 2012).”
No Margin, no Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for public service delivery (2014, background): “This reconciles our finding that incentives do not affect the selection of agents into the job with earlier evidence from the private sector and from the laboratory that suggests substantial selection effects (Bandiera et al., 2007; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Larkin and Leider, 2012; Lazear, 2000; Lazea”
The Cost of High-Powered Incentives: Employee Gaming in Enterprise Software Sales (2014, unknown): “…vendor ð“the vendor”Þ to investigate the extent of timing gaming by the vendor’s salespeople and to empirically estimate one significant cost arising from this gaming: pricing lower than required to make a sale in order to earn a commission on the time frame most favorable to the salesperson.”