On Security Indices for State Estimators in Power Networks

By Henrik Sandberg, André M. H. Teixeira, Karl Henrik Johansson. 2010

353 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b399d135bfa80428df8a5496b540c559d9bc5d24

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Citations in the corpus

Cyber security analysis of state estimators in electric power systems (2010, background): “In general a stealthy attack requires the corruption of more measurements than the targeted ones, see [6], [14].”
Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and challenges (2013, background): “Targeted systems Impact References DC SCADA Invalid state estimation [39] [41] [43] [40] AC SCADA Invalid state estimation [42] [52] [59] Electric market Potential financial losses [58] [57] be authenticated to the communication networks or the grid, and have the access to sensitive information.”
Cyber Security and Privacy Issues in Smart Grids (2012, methodology): “In [56], quantified security metrics are adopted to measure the”
Smart Grid — The New and Improved Power Grid: A Survey (2012, unknown): “Security [7, 19, 50] [164, 162, 250] Privacy [177, 45, 64, 79] [121, 147, 140, 143] [162, 207] Monitoring and Measurement [21, 55, 152] [222, 261, 268] Information Transmission [59, 241, 158] [128, 142]”
Integrity Data Attacks in Power Market Operations (2011, background): “In [9] and [12] two possible indices are proposed for quantifying the required efforts to implement such a class of malicious data attack.”
The Cybersecurity Landscape in Industrial Control Systems (2016, methodology): “In a second approach [137], two security indices are computed for a given state estimator.”
False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids (2011, background): “The preliminary version of this article [Liu et al. 2009] has attracted several research groups to investigate how to defend against false data injection attacks (e.g., [Bobba et al. 2010; Sandberg et al. 2010; Kosut et al. 2010a; 2010c; 2010b; D´ an and Sandberg 2010]).”
Stealth Attacks and Protection Schemes for State Estimators in Power Systems (2010, methodology): “In [7], two security indices were defined that quantify how difficult it is to perform a successful stealth attack against particular measurements.”
Security analysis for Cyber-Physical Systems against stealthy deception attacks (2013, background): “Some papers also proposed the security indices or vulnerability conditions which allow the attacker to perform an elaborate deception attack [12], [13].”
False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids (2009, background): “, [Bobba et al. 2010; Sandberg et al. 2010; Kosut et al. 2010a; 2010c; 2010b; Dán and Sandberg 2010]).”
Optimal Linear Cyber-Attack on Remote State Estimation (2017, background): “[19] analyzed the minimum number of sensors required for a stealthy attack and proposed the concept of measurement security metric.”
A systems and control perspective of CPS security (2019, methodology): “To give the readers a better sense of the impact of cyberattacks and the general problem of CPS security, in what follows, we expand on the impact in the context of power systems [28], [37], [39]–[55].”
Malicious Data Attacks on the Smart Grid (2011, background): “Sandberg, Teixei ra, and Johansson are the first to introduce the measure of the vulnerability of a network to malicious data attack [14] by defining a security index as the minimum number of meters to perform an unobservable attack including a given meter.”
Detecting Integrity Attacks on SCADA Systems (2014, methodology): “Sandberg et al. (2010) propose a method of using security indices in large scale power networks.”
Detecting False Data Injection Attacks on Power Grid by Sparse Optimization (2014, background): “On the other hand, the protection scheme against false data injection attacks are investigated in [11]–[18].”
False Data Injection on State Estimation in Power Systems—Attacks, Impacts, and Defense: A Survey (2017, background): “[21] investigate how many, and by how much, other meters need to be cooperatively compromised to avoid being detected.”