Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting

By Julian Atanassov. 2012

609 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b1f46b837fe9b7ebf005686fc427cf108466e007

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Caroline Flammer
2. Alex Edmans
3. Todd A. Gormley
4. X. Tian
5. Woon Sau Leung
6. Jie Chen
7. Kevin P. Evans
8. Song Ma

In Economics and Econometrics

1. X. Tian
2. Alex Edmans
3. Todd A. Gormley
4. David A. Matsa
5. Tiecheng Leng
6. Song Ma
7. Wei Shi
8. Lin-Kui Jiang

Citations in the corpus

• Do Antitakeover Provisions Spur Corporate Innovation? A Regression Discontinuity Analysis (2018, critical): “Nevertheless, our paper makes an important contribution by presenting evidence opposing the result shown in papers, such as Atanassov (2013), based on somewhat problematic methodologies that ATPs dampen innovation (the underlying methodology in these papers is problematic for the reasons we discuss…”
• Managerial conservatism, board independence and corporate innovation (2018, neutral): “In contrast, Atanassov (2013) documents that by exploiting an exogenous variation in corporate governance caused by the passage of state anti-takeover laws, when managers are protected from the threat of takeover, innovation productivity is reduced.”
• The local innovation spillovers of listed firms (2021, neutral): “If firms are rivals and an increase in innovation by a given firm improves its competitive position, it will reduce the marginal profitability of other firms regarding innovative investment, (6)Antitakeover laws have been associated with reductions in firm leverage (Garvey and Hanka, 1999), manageri”
• The Bright Side of Political Uncertainty: The Case of R&D (2015, positive): “To control for firm characteristics and state economic conditions, we include a set of control variables motivated by Aghion et al. (2005) and Atanassov (2013), who identify potential determinants of R&D investment, both in the cross-section and over time.”
• The Impact of Stakeholder Orientation on Innovation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2016, positive): “We set citations/patents to zero if the company has no patent (see, e.g., Atanassov 2013).13 Constituency Statute is the “treatment dummy”—i.e., a dummy variable that equals one if the company is incorporated in a state that has passed a constituency statute by year t.14 X is the vector of control…”
• Credit Supply and Corporate Innovation (2013, positive): “Atanassov (2012) finds that worse governance reduces the incentives to innovate.”
• Investment, Duration, and Exit Strategies for Corporate and Independent Venture Capital‐Backed Start‐Ups (2015, neutral): “To deal with this problem, we follow Hall et al. (2001) and Atanassov (2013) and we use the “time-technology class fixed effect” method.”
• Top Management Human Capital, Inventor Mobility, and Corporate Innovation (2018, background): “…(e.g., Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011), Tian and Wang (2014), and Chemmanur, Loutskina, and Tian (2014)), anti-takeover provisions (e.g., Atanassov (2013), Chemmanur and Tian (2018), and Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian (2014)), institutional ownership (e.g., Aghion, Van Reenen, and…”
• Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, positive): “Atanassov (2013) shows that the presence of an outside blockholder reduces the negative impact of anti-takeover legislation on patent citations. Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2013) find that both total institutional ownership and the ownership by the largest institution (i.e. her block size) are ”
• Firms’ innovation strategy under the shadow of analyst coverage (2019, methodology): “We address these two problems by using the “timetechnology class fixed effect” method (see Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001, and Atanassov, 2013), in which patents (citations) are scaled by the average number of patents (citations) in the same technology class in the same year.11 Finally, firms…”
• CEO Ownership, External Governance, and Risk-taking (2011, positive): “16 The negative slope in R&D under weak EG is consistent with Atanassov (2010) who documents significant reductions in patents when firms are hit with external shocks allowing managerial entrenchment.”
• How does hedge fund activism reshape corporate innovation? (2016, positive): “Our study contributes to the growing literature exploring how financial markets and corporate governance affect corporate innovation, where earlier studies examined the effects from firms’ public offering decisions ( Bernstein, 2015 ), anti-takeover provisions ( Atanassov, 2013 ), and institutional ”