Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device

By A. Padilla, M. Pagano, Philippe Aghion, S. Bhattacharya, Patrick Bolton, M. Dewatripont, Michael Fishman, Denis Gromb, Inés Tullio Jappelli, George J. Mailath and 9 more. 2000

465 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ae84c8cad3b53382448603f4405d96e03956bee7

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Citations in the corpus

Sharing information in the credit market: Contract-level evidence from U.S. firms (2013, unknown): “[22] Padilla, Jorge A.”
Credit Information Systems in Less Developed Countries: A Test with Microfinance in Guatemala (2007, background): “Padilla and Pagano (1997, 2000) focus on the effect of information sharing as a “borrower discipline device” under perfect competition.”
Country Creditor Rights, Information Sharing and Commercial Banks Profitability Persistence across the world (2007, background): “- 8 - Returning to the 'disciplinary effect' of information, Padilla and Pagano (2000) study the different types of information shared.”
Public Information and Coordination: Evidence from a Credit Registry Expansion (2011, unknown): “And it will a¤ect debt of single lender rms if it reduces bank monitoring incentives (Petersen and Rajan 1995, Rajan 1992), lowers rm reputational incentives (Padilla and Pagano 2000), or reveals hidden rm debt (Parlour and Rajan 2001; Bisin and Guaitoli 2004; Bennardo, Pagano, and Piccolo 2009).”
Information Sharing and Credit: Firm-Level Evidence from Transition Countries (2009, background): “sharing may overcome adverse selection in the credit market (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) and reduce moral hazard, by motivating borrowers to exert high effort in projects and repay loans (Padilla and Pagano, 2000).”
The supply- and demand-side impacts of credit market information (2010, background): “Set against this peril are expected benefits from a decrease in portfolio risk (Campion and Valenzuela, 2001; Jappelli and Pagano, 1999), restraining multiple contracting by borrowers (McIntosh et al, 2006), and the preservation of reputation effects through the formation of long-term credit histori”
Does credit reporting lead to a decline in relationship lending? Evidence from information sharing technology (2018, unknown): “Specifically, lenders may decide to share in order to reduce delinquency rates (Padilla and Pagano 2000; Doblas-Madrid and Minetti 2013) or lower screening costs, particularly for unfamiliar applicants (Pagano and Jappelli 1993; Liberti et al.”
Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition (2007, methodology): “Our presentation here is based in large part on Dell'Ariccia et al. (1999), and Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004); we also discuss Pagano and Jappelli (1993), and Padilla and Pagano (1997, 2000).”
Corruption in bank lending to firms : cross-country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing (2009, methodology): “The information-sharing variables come from DMS (2007), who collect data on private and public credit institutions in 129 countries during 1978-2003.”
How Bank Competition Affects Firms' Access to Finance (2012, unknown): “Credit information sharing mechanisms can help to overcome adverse selection and moral hazard problems in credit markets (Pagano and Jappelli 1993; Padilla and Pagano 2000).”
Do Women Pay More for Credit? Evidence from Italy (2008, unknown): “[19] Padilla, J.”