Corruption in bank lending to firms : cross-country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing
By James R. Barth, Chen Lin, Ping Lin, Frank M. Song. 2009
426 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Finance, Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1f6b723e05c4859f380c1a97cfb79377bf15053f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Finance
- Chen Lin
- Vanessa S. Tchamyou
- Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
- Yue Ma
- Simplice A. Asongu
- Joel F. Houston
- Vojislav Maksimovic
- Frank M. Song
In Information Systems
- Simplice A. Asongu
- Vanessa S. Tchamyou
- Jacinta C. Nwachukwu
- R. Akamavi
- Agyenim Boateng
- Yue Ma
- Chen Lin
- Joel F. Houston
In Sociology and Political Science
- Simplice A. Asongu
- Vanessa S. Tchamyou
- Meghana Ayyagari
- Chen Lin
- Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
- Jacinta C. Nwachukwu
- Yue Ma
- R. Akamavi
Citations in the corpus
- Importing Corruption Culture from Overseas: Evidence from Corporate Tax Evasion in the United States (2015, background): “9 For example, see Fisman (2001), Djankov et al. (2002), and Barth et al. (2009).”
- Information Asymmetry and Financial Development Dynamics in Africa (2016, positive): “…Triki & Gajigo, 2014), reduce credit cost (Brown et al., 2009), decrease rates of default (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002), affects corruptionrelated lending (Barth et al., 2009), influences antitrust intervention (Coccorese, 2012) and affect syndicated bank loans (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010).”
- Economic uncertainty and bank risk: Evidence from emerging economies (2020, positive): “Barth et al. (2008, 2009) find that greater official supervisory power, other than promoting higher bank stability, instead leads to more severe corruption in lending.”
- Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world (2009, background): “One technique used in previous studies to avoid these problems is to construct a corruption dummy that takes the value 0 for responses “never” “seldom” and “sometimes” and 1 for “frequently”, “mostly,” and “always” (Beck et al., 2006; Barth et al. 2008).”
- Collectivism and corruption in bank lending (2013, positive): “An exporter may face fewer obstacles caused by bank corruption in its home country if it has access to external finance abroad, as such financing would strengthen its bargaining position with domestic banks (Barth et al., 2009).”
- Leverage and investment under a state-owned bank lending environment : evidence from China (2008, background): “In fact, this is a regular finding in the finance and growth literature (e.g., Molina, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Laeven and Woodruff, 2007; Barth et al., 2008).”
- Information Sharing and Financial Sector Development in Africa (2017, background): “, 2009); influence corrupt-related lending (Barth et al., 2009) and affect antitrust intervention (Coccorese, 2012).”
- The Role of Information Sharing in Modulating the Effect of Financial Access on Inequality (2019, background): “…has been focused on emerging economies in Asia and Latin America and on developed countries, while Africa has been documented to be a continent where financial development is lowest (Barth et al., 2009; Galindo & Miller, 2001; Love & Mylenko, 2003; Triki & Gajigo, 2014; World Bank, 2016).”
- Firm Innovation in Emerging Markets: The Role of Finance, Governance, and Competition (2011, methodology): “World Bank survey data, both the Enterprise Surveys and their precursor, the WBES, have been used in a large number of studies, including Djankov et al. (2003), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005), (2008), Cull and Xu (2005), and Barth et al. (2009).”
- Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Acquisition Outcomes (2011, neutral): “14 Similar measure has been used in other recent studies such as Barth, Lin, Lin, and Song (2009) and Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010). investors are better informed and more capable monitors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005).”