Channel Bargaining with Retailer Asymmetry

By Anthony J. Dukes, Esther Gal‐Or, Kannan Srinivasan. 2006

210 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Information Systems, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ae71630f340e36797b3ee6a11243d1f9dbe88540

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Citations in the corpus

Promoting electric automobiles: supply chain analysis under a government’s subsidy incentive scheme (2013, methodology): “For similar models, see, e.g., Davidson (1988), Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003), Lommerud et al. (2005), Dukes et al. (2006), Symeonidis (2008), etc.”
A Larger Slice or a Larger Pie? An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining Power in the Distribution Channel (2008, methodology): “Our interpretation of the generalized Nash bargaining model follows the theoretical papers by Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003) and Dukes et al. (2006). We extend their insights to a rich empirical setting with heterogeneous consumers, and multiple competing manufacturers and retailers.”
Design of the Reverse Channel for Remanufacturing: Must Profit‐Maximization Harm the Environment? (2017, background): “Thus, we investigate the case of egalitarian bargaining, which allocates payoffs based on each party’s relative bargaining power (Cai et al. 2012, Dukes et al. 2006, Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975, Myerson 1997).”
Impacts of Power Structure on Supply Chains with Uncertain Demand (2013, background): “Unlike these articles that do not take into account the competition among retailers, Dukes et al. (2006) show that manu-facturers’ proﬁts may increase when a retailer gains an exogenous cost advantage over its rival retailer.”
The Strategic Role of Third‐Party Marketplaces in Retailing (2014, unknown): “Similarly, Dukes et al. (2006), using an upstream oligopoly setup, have shown that it is better for the dominant manufacturer (in terms of market share) to have a powerful down-stream retailer.”
Channel Selection and Contracting in the Presence of a Retail Platform (2018, background): “Dukes et al. (2006) showed that manufacturers can beneﬁt from cost asymmetry between two retailers, one of whom is low-cost and has a better bargaining position than its rival.”