Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

By Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris. 2011

264 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/241374cf03a282e7595af0eb42e328791fe6f0c2

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Markets for Information: An Introduction (2018, background): “In an oligopoly setting with incomplete information, Bergemann and Morris (2013) analyze the information structure that guarantees the highest industry profit.”
Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination (2016, unknown): “When Sims (2003), Reis (2006), and Gabaix (2014) introduce different (but also complementary) formalizations of “inattention”, they focus on single-agent decision problems, thus precluding a meaningful distinction between the two types of uncertainty.16 When Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2014), and Ar”
Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2019, unknown): “This case has been the focus of some our own work (Bergemann and Morris (2013b), (2016a)), where we show that the set of outcomes that can arise in this setting corresponds to a version of incomplete information equilibrium ("Bayes correlated equilibrium") that allows outcomes to be conditioned on s”
The Friendship Paradox and Systematic Biases in Perceptions and Social Norms (2016, background): “This is a variation on the games studied by Ballester, CalvóArmengol, and Zenou (2006); Bergemann and Morris (2013); Bramoullé and Kranton (2014); Belhaj, Bramoulle, and Deröıan (2014); de Marti and Zenou (2015).(12) The advantage of the linear-quadratic formulation is that it admits a closed-form s”
Revealed Preference, Rational Inattention, and Costly Information Acquisition (2015, unknown): “[2012], Bergemann and Morris [2013b]).”
Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (2017, unknown): “4Focusing on experiments is with loss of generality in settings with multiple receivers in Bergemann and Morris (2013), Alonso and Câmara (2016c), Mathevet et al. (2017), and Taneva (2016). obedience constraints instead of participation constraints.5 The equivalence between persuasion mechanisms…”
Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits (2019, background): “ploration, whereas the other papers consider the greedy algorithm in the setting of linear contextual bandits. 5Formally, the distribution over joint actions must be the Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2013). CHAPTER 11. BANDITS AND INCENTIVES 146 11.6.2 Repeated auctions: agents”