Information structures in optimal auctions

By Dirk Bergemann, Martin Pesendorfer. Journal of Economics Theory, 2007

342 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0e468b38dbf33bdaf93d81da2a6b7cdef135b691

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Anton Kolotilin
2. Anne-Katrin Roesler
3. Andriy Zapechelnyuk
4. Ming Li
5. Tymofiy Mylovanov
6. Hao Li
7. Xianwen Shi
8. Balázs Szentes

In Marketing

1. Anne-Katrin Roesler
2. Andriy Zapechelnyuk
3. Anton Kolotilin
4. Ming Li
5. Tymofiy Mylovanov
6. Hao Li
7. Xianwen Shi
8. Balázs Szentes

In Safety Research

1. Andriy Zapechelnyuk
2. Anton Kolotilin
3. Ming Li
4. Tymofiy Mylovanov
5. Hao Li
6. Ettore Damiano

Citations in the corpus

• Discriminatory Information Disclosure (2017, background): “Besanko, 1984; Courty and Li, 2000), the decomposition technique has proven very useful because in general dynamic environments, it allows one to prove an envelope theorem (Pavan, Segal and Toikka, 2014) and extend the irrelevance theorem (Eső and Szentes, 2017).(3) In these environments, one can de”
• Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (2017, positive): “(9)The literature on optimal informational structures in auctions has been initiated in Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007). See Eso and Szentes (2007), Bergemann and Wambach (2013), and Hao and Shi (2015) for recent contributions.”
• Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing (2017, background): “Therefore, the 3Another strand of the literature analyzes the seller’s incentives to reveal information about the buyers’ valuations prior to participating in an auction, see for example, Ganuza (2004), Ganuza and Penalva (2010) and Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007).”
• Price discrimination and efficient matching (2006, methodology): “We start with the revenue from the perfect sorting 15 Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2001) use the same techniques to answer the question of how much private information an auctioneer should allow the bidder to learn about his valuation.”
• Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (2011, neutral): “For example, Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) characterizes the revenue-maximizing information structure in an auction with many bidders.”