A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals

By J. Bennett. 2003

675 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ad92ad3a8e929b692fe1e365db5b50a692b325e1

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

In History and Philosophy of Science

In Philosophy

Citations in the corpus

On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only If) (2009, background): “This particular way of telling the story has been retold often ‐ see, e.g., Bennett (2003) ; Edgington (1995, 2006); Kratzer (1986).”
The conditional in mental probability logic (2010, background): “Bennett [4] justified Adams’ suggestion in terms of conversational implicatures [25].”
The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation (2006, background): “Until recently, psychological research on conditionals has not properly recognized the suppositional nature of if, which has been more clearly developed by the work of philosophical logicians (Bennett, 2003; Edgington, 1995).”
Betting on conditionals (2010, methodology): “Ramsey (1929/1990) proposed a method for evaluating indicative conditionals that has long had a major impact in philosophical logic (Bennett, 2003) and more recently in psychology (Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007).”
Précis of Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning (2009, methodology): “In the normative literature, this identification is simply called “The Equation” (Adams, 1998; Bennett, 2003; Edgington, 1995).”
Dynamic inference and everyday conditional reasoning in the new paradigm (2013, background): “Bennett (2003) discussed cases of weakness of will.”
The psychology of inferring conditionals from disjunctions: A probabilistic study (2012, background): “10–11), just as it is generally in subjective probability theory (De Finetti, 1937–1964, 1974; Ramsey, 1926–1990). These degrees of belief or levels of confidence can be the result of various cognitive processes. To return to our example, the doctor may initially consider (1) as a hypothesis H to ac”
When aspect matters: the case of would-conditionals (2007, background): “How abrupt is the divergence? How far back does it start? Here is a description to be found in Bennett (2003) , introducing the notions of forks and ramps:”