The conditional in mental probability logic

By PD Dr. Dr. Niki Pfeifer, Gernot D. Kleiter. 2010

85 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/61cb32ec5ef7bb3b682fa98ecceffc35ad4303f3

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In Artificial Intelligence

Citations in the corpus

The psychology of inferring conditionals from disjunctions: A probabilistic study (2012, background): “Probability theory, and not extensional logic, supplies the computational level and formal theory of reasoning in the new paradigm (Oaksford & Chater, 2007, 2009; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2010).”
Questions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoning (2012, background): “…consider how people reason with degrees of uncertainty in all of their beliefs, as proposed originally by de Finetti (1937/1964) and Ramsey (1926/1990), the founders of contemporary Bayesianism (Oaksford & Chater, 2007, 2009; Over, 2009; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2010; Politzer, Over, & Baratgin, 2010).”
Reasoning to and from belief: Deduction and induction are still distinct (2013, background): “A conditional for which the Equation holds has been called a probability conditional (Adams, 1998; Oaksford & Chater, 2007), a conditional event (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2010, 2011), or a suppositional conditional (Evans & Over, 2004).”
Betting on conditionals (2010, background): “…paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, with new probability theories of the natural language indicative conditional (Chater & Oaksford, 2009; Evans, 2007; Evans & Over, 2004; Manktelow, Over, & Elqayam, in press; Oaksford & Chater, 2001, 2007, 2009; Over, 2009; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2006, 2010).”
Uncertainty and the de Finetti tables (2013, background): “(See Pfeifer, 2013 this issue, and Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2010, for more on conditionals with antecedents having zero probability.)”
Dynamic inference and everyday conditional reasoning in the new paradigm (2013, background): “For example, Pfeifer and Kleiter (2010) explicitly present their model as a mental probability logic.”
Bayesian reasoning with ifs and ands and ors (2015, background): “This implies that, if one interprets the conditional as the conditional event, the if-to-or inference is coherent when the probability of the conclusion is equal or higher than that of the premise, whereas the or-to-if inference is coherent when the probability of the conclusion is equal or lower…”