Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model

By Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt. 2004

240 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ac1e718a6448e3c57852ead0a510394035cc2ca4

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Citations in the corpus

Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking (2016, background): “1999, Fehr and Schmidt 2004). Somewhat surprisingly, the impact of competition on the multitask problem has not attracted much attention a fortiori not in combination with adverse selection.37 As in earlier work, employers in our model choose (linear or nonlinear) compensation structures aiming to ”
Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to School (2005, unknown): “In laboratory experiments, Fehr and Schmidt (2004) found that individuals under high-powered incentive systems may lose their motivation and, thus, work less than under a flat wage regime.”
Experimental economics: Where next? (2010, background): “For this reason, we shall speak of a parametrization rather than a calibration when referring to the manner in which Fehr and Schmidt assign values to their parameters in the various papers we examine. 2. Fehr and Schmidt do not keep the distribution of parameters constant. This is a major cause for”
Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights (2008, methodology): “Our article is also related to Fehr and Schmidt (2004) and Fehr et al. (2007) which also focus on the importance of the interaction between selfish and fair types.”
A Behavioral Account of the Labor Market: The Role of Fairness Concerns (2008, background): “There is laboratory (Fehr & Schmidt 2004) and field evidence (Prendergast 1999) for the relevance of the multi-tasking problem.”
Paradoxes and mechanisms for choice under risk (2014, methodology): “The most commonly used mechanism for multiple-decision social preferences experiments is PAS (e.g. Bohnet et al. 2008; Charness and Haruvy 2002; Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt 2004), which has internal theoretical validity for income models of decision under risk.”
Organizational Control Systems and Pay-for-Performance in the Public Service (2013, background): “…much evidence of this effect (Staw & Boettger, 1990; Gilliland & Landis, 1992; Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma, 2004; Ordonez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009).3 For example, Fehr and Schmidt (2004) show that output-dependent financial incentives lead to the neglect of non-contractible tasks.”
“Not Just for the Money?” How Financial Incentives Affect the Number of Publications at Danish Research Institutions (2008, background): “One problem, studied in economics under the heading of ‘‘multiple tasking’’ (Prendergast 1999; Fehr and Schmidt 2004), is that performance-related pay schemes induce researchers to perform well in those areas that pay off and reduce their effort on other important aspects of their jobs (e.g.,…”
Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School (2012, background): “Teachers may multitask (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), reducing their efforts along other dimensions.2 Such schemes may also demoralize teachers, resulting in less effort (Fehr and Schmidt 2004), or may harm teachers' intrinsic motivation to teach (Kreps 1997).”