Political Capital in a Market Economy

By Victor Nee, Sonja Opper. 2010

164 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a9d8d8d3060607039391a8587b3d5b9ff2fa4b6d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Sociology and Political Science

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Institutional Strategies in Emerging Markets (2015, background): “Nee and Opper (2010) point out that state-owned firms with connections to political elite have been found to perform worse than private firms because they may be forced to maintain higher employment levels (see also, Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; and Shleifer & Vishny, 1994).”
Risk Aversion and Guanxi Activities: A Behavioral Analysis of CEOs in China (2017, background): “In China’s political markets, government and administrative ties can be effective in securing access to land rights, building leases, loans from state-owned banks, research grants and official permits such as export licenses, and other resources allocated by the state (Nee & Opper, 2010).”
The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China* (2017, unknown): “…load, offer relief from taxation and fees, and make it easier to acquire resources that are controlled by the state, notably bank loans and land-use rights; they also help improve legal oversight to stave off predatory behavior (Y. Lin, 2001; Chen and Dickson, 2010; Nee and Opper, 2010, 2012).”
Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions (2015, unknown): “The market transition argument does not claim that political ties have no value – they continue to add value under certain circumstances (Nee and Opper, 2010; Shi et al., 2014).”
Institutional Barriers and Industry Dynamics (2014, background): “Such institutional buffering effects, by definition independent of productivity, can take either intangible forms, such as legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002), or tangible forms, such as government contracts or direct subsidy (Nee and Opper, 2010).”