Fund Advisor Compensation in Closed‐End Funds

By J. Coles, José R. Suay, D. Woodbury. 2000

112 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a7763cb68c252d6bde9dcbbe89dd3ce8af95d09e

How researchers see this paper

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In Accounting

1. Todd Milbourn
2. G. Garvey
3. D. Deli
4. G. Gemmill
5. O. Faleye
6. Fenghua Song
7. Radhakrishnan Gopalan
8. Han Xia

In Finance

1. Todd Milbourn
2. G. Garvey
3. D. Deli
4. G. Gemmill
5. O. Faleye
6. Radhakrishnan Gopalan
7. Fenghua Song
8. Han Xia

In Strategy and Management

1. D. Deli
2. Todd Milbourn

Citations in the corpus

• Incentive Compensation when Executives can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section (2003, background): “However, there is little empirical evidence of RPE, either in the explicit design of compensation contracts (see Coles, Suay, and Woodbury (2000) and Deli (2002)), or in the estimated relationship between compensation and market movements (see for example, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a), Antle and…”
• Managerial Incentives and Risk-taking (2006, unknown): “See Smith and Watts (1992), Bizjak et al. (1993), Yermack (1995), Holderness et al. (1999), Core and Guay (1999), Guay (1999), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Coles et al. (2000), Deli (2002), and others.”
• Noise Trading, Costly Arbitrage, and Asset Prices: Evidence from Closed‐end Funds (2002, background): “Endnotes 1 There have been more than 300 U.K.-traded closed-end equity funds in existence thoughout the 1990s, as compared with less than 100 in the U.S. Closed-end funds are about 25 percent of the value of open-end funds in the U.K., whereas in the U.S. they are only two percent of the value of op”
• Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry (2019, unknown): “, Das and Sundaram (2002), Golec and Starks (2004)), Cuoco and Kaniel (2011)).”
• Incentives and Mutual Fund Performance: Higher Performance or Just Higher Risk Taking? (2009, unknown): “We use information on the fund advisory contract, and we build on the literature that has studied advisory compensation and used it as a proxy for actual incentives received by fund managers (Coles et al., 2000; Deli, 2002; Deli and Varma, 2002; Kuhnen, 2004; Warner and Wu, 2004).”
• Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts: An Empirical Investigation (2002, background): “15 We also follow Coles et al. (2000) in defining an alternative measure meant to capture”
• Mutual Funds and Bubbles: The Surprising Role of Contractual Incentives (2008, unknown): “6 We follow the literature [Coles et al. (2000); Deli (2002); Deli and Varma (2002); Kuhnen (2004); Warner and Wu (2004)] in using the compensation specified in these contractual arrangements as a proxy for the actual incentives received by the fund manager.”
• Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad (2006, background): “, Crystal, 1991), at which point it is known whether exogenous forces (luck) have turned out favorably or unfavorably for the firm. At this stage, the executive’s self-interest is straightforward; emphasize benchmarking and removal of exogenous influences from compensation only if the benchmark is d”