Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal-Principal Perspective

By M. N. Young, Mike W. Peng, D. Ahlstrom, Garry D. Bruton, Yi Jiang. 2008

1,833 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a54c18c43dfefaef6a2a245810d30eb80689f4f7

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Citations in the corpus

The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on real and accrual earnings management practices: evidence from Jordan (2019, background): “Foreign investors may have a positive CG effect as they may have more power to monitor corporations than local investors (Young et al., 2008).”
East Meets West? Board Characteristics in an Emerging Market: Evidence from Turkish Banks (2008, background): “They maintain that emerging markets are better characterized by principal–principal conflict, where dominant (usually family) shareholders abuse the rights of minority shareholders as, by extension, profit maximization is rarely pursued in publicly traded corporations (Young et al., 2008).”
International Diversification (2012, background): “there is some evidence (hoskisson et al. 1994; Young et al. 2008) that institutional shareholders promote good governance, and thereby improve firm performance.”
Are Family Firms Good Employers (2017, background): “…of monitoring and incentivizing employees, family involvement provides added incentive to use the information avail ble to the family as insiders to opportunistically exploit nonfamily employees and disenfranchise minority owners (Schulze et al., 2001; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008).”
Firm performance, corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan (2018, background): “Such expropriation is very likely in emerging markets where formal institutions are weak to support mutually beneficial impersonal exchange between economic players (see, Jameson, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal 2014; Young et al. 2008).”
Institutions, Resources, and Entry Strategies in Emerging Economies (2020, positive): “In such an environment, firms are typically controlled by a dominant stakeholder (individual or family), a business group, or the state (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Kock and Gullén, 2001; Kedia, Mukherjee, and Lahiri, 2006; Young et al., 2008).”
Developing theory from strategic management research in China (2008, background): “Also, as modern corporate governance mechanisms (such as outside directors) are increasingly introduced, an area of rising research interest is the conflicts among various stakeholders of the firm (Peng, 2004; Peng, Zhang, & Li, 2007; Young et al., 2008).”
Home country institutions and the internationalization of state owned enterprises: A cross-country analysis (2016, background): “When state-ownership is mixed with private ownership in hybrid organizations such as listed SOEs, while the dual agency conflict may be reduced by the influence of minority private shareholders, , a principal-principal conflict may emerge because private and state owners may pursue different objecti”
Ownership structure and innovation: An emerging market perspective (2013, methodology): “breed PP conflicts, that is, misuse of firm resources by powerful controlling shareholders at the expense of smaller shareholders (Su et al., 2007; Young et al., 2008).”
How does family control influence firm strategy and performance? A meta-analysis of us publicly listed firms (2015, background): “Here, family control is seen as a device to entrench managers who are difficult to remove through proxy contests or the market for corporate control (Young et al., 2008).”
Corporate Social Responsibility in China: A Corporate Governance Approach (2014, background): “In another line of research about emerging economies, corporate governance issues are also popular in the literature (Lau et al. 2007; Tian and Lau 2001; Young et al. 2008).”