East Meets West? Board Characteristics in an Emerging Market: Evidence from Turkish Banks

By Turhan Kaymak, Eralp Bektaş. 2008

171 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3eebbc8507fc33d4ff55ec294a8d7cfe15d579fe

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1. Ekrem Tatoğlu
2. Mehmet Demirbag
3. I. Ciftci
4. Selim Zaim
5. Anil Kumar Sharma
6. Nidhi Bansal
7. G. Wood

Citations in the corpus

• Corporate governance and firm performance in emerging markets: Evidence from Turkey (2019, background): “Executive board membership The number of executive directors divided by the total number of board of directors Firms' annual reports and corporate web pages Mobbs (2015); Kaymak and Bektas (2008) I.”
• Governance, Efficiency and Risk Taking in Chinese Banking (2017, unknown): “In relation to the variables explaining the functioning of the board, we find that the coefficients on Duality are negative and statistically significant in profit efficiency models (see, for example, Kaymak & Bektas, 2008 and Wang et al., 2012 for similar results).”
• Board Composition and Firm Performance: Evidence from Bangladesh (2010, unknown): “The idea of the introduction of independent directors may have benefits for greater transparency, but the non-consideration of the underlying institutional and cultural differences in an emerging economy such as Bangladesh may not result in economic value addition to the firm.”
• Audit Committee, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from India (2016, background): “Some studies (Kaymak & Bektas, 2008; Lin, 2011; Ujunwa, 2012) criticize the dual role of the CEO, as almost absolute decision making authority with one person might not be in the best interest of stakeholders.”
• The Influence of Board Size on Intellectual Capital Disclosure by Kenyan Listed Firms (2010, unknown): “Larger boards are difficult to control by the chairperson, and smaller boards are hence preferred for good-quality relevant disclosure (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Kaymak and Bektas, 2008).”