Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges

By Takao Kato, Cheryl X. Long. Economic development and cultural change, 2006

331 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/006676840416ee69671619d10d4dfff5a28a1ccb

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Citations in the corpus

Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms (2015, background): “While recent studies have investigated executive pay in China (e.g., Buck et al., 2008; Firth, Fung and Rui, 2007; Kato and Long, 2006), none of them have explicitly examined the effect of politically connected directors on top executive remuneration.”
Corporate Governance in China: A Meta‐Analysis (2018, background): “As capital markets and related financial reforms become more influential in China, empirical studies indicate a stronger effect of alignment mechanisms on firm outcomes over time (Chen et al., 2011a; Conyon and He, 2011; Firth et al., 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Kato and Long, 2006).”
Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China (2014, unknown): “Existing studies on Chinese executive compensation have documented a positive correlation between executive pay and firm performance (Buck et al. 2008; Conyon and He 2011, 2012; Firth et al. 2006a, 2007; Kato and Long 2006a).”
Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: A Simultaneous Equation Approach (2015, background): “Second, the extant literature has focused mostly on cash-based rather than equity-based executive compensation (Conyon, 1997; Benito and Conyon, 1999; Kato and Long, 2006; Buck et al., 2008; Shen and Zhang, 2013).”
Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions (2015, unknown): “Relative to all China studies on CEO compensation reviewed in Table I, our sample has the longest time span containing data from eight years, whereas most previous studies on listed firms use a shorter span of two to four years (Buck et al., 2008; Firth et al., 2006; Kato and Long, 2006; Wen et al.,”
Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market (2011, background): “Second, providing non-cash subsidies and perquisites has been one of traditional compensation treatment under Chinese corporate culture (Chen et al., 2010; Kato and Long, 2006).”
CEO gender, executive compensation and firm performance in Chinese‐listed enterprises (2013, background): “Kato and Long (2006) note greater CEO turnover in Chinese-listed entities with lower levels of state ownership.”