Using Loopholes to Reveal the Marginal Cost of Regulation: The Case of Fuel-Economy Standards

By Sören Anderson, J. Sallee. 2011

147 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Automotive Engineering, Economics and Econometrics, Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a434c494719f29a5037b5b1a6441ee9faaa4fbf0

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Automotive Engineering

1. J. Sallee
2. Sören Anderson

In Economics and Econometrics

1. J. Sallee
2. Sören Anderson
3. Xavier D’Haultfœuille
4. P. Givord

In Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment

1. J. Sallee
2. Sören Anderson
3. C. Cattaneo
4. Mark Jacobsen

Citations in the corpus

• The Environmental Effect of Green Taxation: the Case of the French "Bonus/Malus" (2014, background): “For instance, Anderson and Sallee (2011) using US data on consumer expectation on gasoline prices show that consumer beliefs are indistinguishable from a no-change forecast.”
• Car Notches: Strategic Automaker Responses to Fuel Economy Policy (2010, unknown): “Figure 10 is a histogram of the number of models of all vehicles produced from 1991 to 2007 by their CAFE fuel rating, whether they are subject to the Gas Guzzler Tax or not.”
• Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimators with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects (2018, unknown): “Anderson and Sallee (2011), Using Loopholes to Reveal the Marginal Cost of Regulation: The Case of Fuel-Economy Standards. Table 5 Column 2. In the regression in Table 5 Column (2), the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a car sold is a flexible fuel vehicle, and the explanatory variable”
• Gasoline Taxes and Consumer Behavior (2014, unknown): “As an illustration, we calculate the change in tax revenues associated with a 5 cent-per-gallon increase in federal gasoline taxes based on (1) a naive estimate using the tax-inclusive price elasticity in column 1 of Table 3; and (2) the corresponding tax elasticity estimate from column 2 of Table 3”
• The demand for ethanol as a gasoline substitute (2012, background): “3 The federal Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988 created strong incentives under the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards program for automakers with binding CAFE constraints to produce flexible-fuel vehicles [18].”
• The Surprising Incidence of Tax Credits for the Toyota Prius (2011, background): “(15) Using the pure discount rate of 4 percent, as suggested by Corrado, Dunn, and Otoo (2006), produces a perverse price estimate.”