How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value?

By Belén Villalonga, Raphael Amit. 2006

4,154 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/356343baae0162d2786081645447f47b09437971

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Citations in the corpus

“SEW” What Do We Know and Where Do We Go? A Review of Socioemotional Wealth and a Way Forward (2020, background): “…among other SEW dimensions temporally, as the emotional attachment to the firm can change over generations (e.g., Schulze et al., 2001; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), influence the control of the firm when evaluating between internal versus external successors (e.g., Minichilli et al.,…”
Who are the active investors? Evidence from venture capital (2008, background): “[69] Villalonga, Belen, and Raphael Amit, (2006) ’How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value?’ Journal of Financial Economics, 80 (2), 385— 417.”
Family firms and firm performance: Evidence from Japan (2008, neutral): “Previous studies in the US, Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) have less stringent requirements for family ownership.”
Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone (2011, positive): “Regarding the potential costs of family ownership, although it may help to solve the classic owner-manager agency problem, it may create conflicts between the controlling family and minority shareholders (Villalonga and Amit, 2006).”
Family Involvement and Agency Cost Control Mechanisms in Family Small and Medium‐Sized Enterprises (2015, methodology): “This situation may reduce altruism and efficient collaboration and information exchange (Gallo and Vilaseca 1998; Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel, and Gutierrez 2001); (3) Conflicts of interest between family members and nonfamily members (Chrisman, Chua, and Litz 2004; Daily and Dollinger 1993; Villalong”
The Adolescence of Family Firm Research (2012, positive): “…a similar, but more focused, exploration of the factors accounting for performance differences among types of family firms (e.g., Bennedsen et al., 2007) as well as the factors that explain the performance of family firms relative to other types of organizations (e.g., Villalonga & Amit, 2006).”
Resource-Based Theory and Corporate Diversification (2011, background): “For example, because the extent to which family ownership is susceptible to the agency problem is still not totally clear (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), the impact of family involvement on diversification is worthy of future investigation.”
One Share - One Vote: The Theory (2007, background): “There is evidence that family owners, who often have leveraged voting power, add value as monitors in rms managed by non-family CEOs (Villalonga and Amit, 2006).”
Family Business Groups around the World: Financing Advantages, Control Motivations and Organizational Choices (2011, methodology): “Following Villalonga and Amit (2006), we control for a firm’s beta in the Q regression.”