The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuotactile integration and self-attribution.

By Manos Tsakiris, Patrick Haggard. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 2005

1,337 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Human-Computer Interaction

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a21e482a5a08af300f01ba9f29bd9115e47eeca7

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Citations in the corpus

Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood. (2009, background): “finger [ 33 ,36], hand [12] or hemibody [37]).”
My body in the brain: a neurocognitive model of body-ownership. (2010, positive): “postural representations of body-parts, see Costantini and Haggard 2007; Tsakiris and Haggard 2005, see also Graziano, Cooke and Taylor 2000; Pavani, Spence and Driver 2000; but cf. Armel and Ramachandran 2003), or when the rubber hand is of a different laterality with respect to one's own…”
Touching a rubber hand: feeling of body ownership is associated with activity in multisensory brain areas (2005, positive): “In the next experiment, we examined whether the illusion was associated with a drift in the felt position of the hand, because this has been reported for the visual rubber-hand illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005).”
A review of verbal and non-verbal human-robot interactive communication (2014, background): “The McGurk effect is an instance of so-called multi-sensory perception phenome a [133], which also include other interesting cases such as th e rubber hand illusion [134].”
The Sense of Embodiment in Virtual Reality (2012, background): “…indicate where the real hand is located, with eyes closed, the participant will typically mislocalize it toward the rubber hand in comparison to a similar measurement taken before the synchronous visual-tactile stimulation (Botvinick & Cohen; Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005).”
Multimodal contributions to body representation (2016, background): “Interestingly, the RHI only occurs when the rubber hand is placed in an anatomically plausible position (Pavani et al., 2000; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005), which suggest that this phenomenon is modulated by top-down signals that originate from the visual representation of one’s own body (see also…”
The Phenomenological Mind (2007, positive): “Consistent with the phenomenology of embodiment, in everyday engaged action afferent or sensory-feedback signals are attenuated, implying a recessive consciousness of our body (see, for example, Merleau-Ponty 1962; Tsakiris and Haggard 2005).”
The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency vs. Joint-Agency (2012, background): “In particular, they have proposed that efferent signals are used to generate accurate temporal and kinematic predictions about how and when particular body parts should move (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris, Haggard, Franck, Mainy, & Sirigu, 2005; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006).”
What is embodiment? A psychometric approach. (2008, positive): “Indeed, while some studies have found synchronous stimulation to be necessary to elicit the rubber hand illusion (e.g., Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005 ), others have found significant e!ects of the rubber hand in conditions where no brushing of either hand ever took place (e.g., Farne` et al., 2000; Pava”
Technology and the Body: the (Im)Possibilities of Re-embodiment (2011, background): “Tsakiris and Haggard 2005 ), an experiment in which participants observe a prosthetic rubber hand being stroked synchronously with a stroking of their own unseen hand.”
The role of interaction in virtual embodiment: Effects of the virtual hand representation (2016, background): “While the brain can believe that a fake limb belongs to the body [34, 13], a basic morphological similarity or spatial configuration between the real and artificial body is still required [15].”
Neural signatures of body ownership: a sensory network for bodily self-consciousness. (2007, methodology): “An important behavioral/phenomenal correlate of the attribution of the rubber hand to one's own body is a change in the perceived location of the subject's hand toward the rubber hand (Tsakiris and Haggard 2005b).”
If I Were You: Perceptual Illusion of Body Swapping (2008, positive): “This suggests that the temporal and spatial patterns of visual and somatosensory signals play an important role in how we come to experience that a limb is part of our own body [5,7,18,19].”
Inducing Illusory Ownership of a Virtual Body (2009, methodology): “Regarding the underlying mechanisms it has been suggested that the illusion happens as the result of the integration and interpretation of visual, tactile and position sense (proprioceptive) signals (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Makin et al., 2008; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005).”