Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood.
By Olaf Blanke, Thomas K. Metzinger. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2009
964 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology, Human-Computer Interaction
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dde723952b767581ba8138166c633bc48ec72d84
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Mel Slater
- Maria V. Sanchez-Vives
- Anil K. Seth
- Hugo D. Critchley
- Karl J. Friston
- Olaf Blanke
- Domna Banakou
- Keisuke Suzuki
In Social Psychology
- Mel Slater
- Maria V. Sanchez-Vives
- Domna Banakou
- Raphaela Groten
- Christophe Lopez
- Konstantina Kilteni
- Manos Tsakiris
- Olaf Blanke
In Human-Computer Interaction
- Mel Slater
- Maria V. Sanchez-Vives
- Domna Banakou
- Olaf Blanke
- Raphaela Groten
- Konstantina Kilteni
- Christophe Lopez
- Richard Skarbez
Citations in the corpus
- The building blocks of the full body ownership illusion (2013, background): “This illusion is particularly interesting for the study of self-consciousness as it relies on an altered representation of the entire body (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Blanke, 2012) and, as such, it is complementary to the “rubber hand illusion” (RHI) paradigm in the study of body perception.”
- A Survey of Presence and Related Concepts (2017, background): “Blanke and Metzinger state that embodiment includes, “the subjective experience of using and ‘having’ a body” [18].”
- The role of interaction in virtual embodiment: Effects of the virtual hand representation (2016, background): “Furthermore, correlated vestibular cues can also increase the sense of location [2].”
- Multimodal contributions to body representation (2016, background): “Furthermore, this illusion can be induced as a full-body experience, with the feeling of ‘global ownership’ of another body (studied in the full-body illusion; for a review see Blanke and Metzinger, 2009).”
- Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain (2016, background): “A simple classification, from ‘low’ to ‘high’ levels, would range from experiences of being and having a body (10) (63) (64), through to the experience of perceiving the world from a particular point of view (a first person perspective, see (65) (66)), to experiences of intention and agency (67) (68”
- The immersive spatiotemporal hallucination model of dreaming (2010, methodology): “While Blanke and Metzinger (2008) use the term weak 1PP to refer to a visuospatial or auditory 1PP, I use it here in the more reduced sense of a purely spatiotemproal 1PP.”
- My body in the brain: a neurocognitive model of body-ownership. (2010, positive): “…of current multisensory input in determining the experience of a minimal 1 st person-perspective (Ehrsson, 2007), self-location (Leggenhager et al, 2007) and self-identification (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008), three conditions that are critical for the experience of selfhood (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009).”
- The Sense of Embodiment in Virtual Reality (2012, background): “The sense of agency refers to the sense of having ‘‘global motor control, including the subjective experience of action, control, intention, motor selection and the conscious experience of will’’ (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009, p. 7).”
- Reconstructing and deconstructing the self: cognitive mechanisms in meditation practice. (2015, background): “This aspect of selfhood has been referred to as the “minimal self” [85] and “minimal phenomenal self” [86] and has been hypothesized to be instantiated in cortical activity in regions related to interoception, such as the anterior insula [87–89], in the temporo-parietal junction [90], as well as in ”
- An Interoceptive Predictive Coding Model of Conscious Presence (2011, methodology): “We speculate that this integrative generative model may be a key component of a core sense of selfhood, in line with recent hierarchical models of the self (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Feinberg, 2011) including those based on perceptual aspects of global body ownership (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009).”
- First Person Experience of Body Transfer in Virtual Reality (2010, background): “in the girl's body, 1PP) and touch (TS), concordant with a recent account of self-consciousness [15].”
- Illusory ownership of a virtual child body causes overestimation of object sizes and implicit attitude changes (2013, methodology): “2 E and F), the within-groups main effect for condition has F(1,44) = 9.”