The Phenomenological Mind

By Shaun Gallagher, D. Zahavi. 2007

1,570 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Preface to the Second Edition 1. Introduction: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science, and Phenomenology 2. Methodology 3. Consciousness/Self-consciousness 4. Time 5. Intentionality 6. The Embodied Mind 7. Action 8. How we Know Others 9. Situated and Extended Minds 10. Self and Person. Bibliography. Index

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b1617a3c9c2603a0da849a6de66bf46dfe1f0bec

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Citations in the corpus

Multiple aspects in the sense of agency (2012, neutral): “When I perceive or remember or imagine X, I am also aware that I am living through or undergoing this experience (see, e.g., Gallagher and Zahavi 2005; 2008; Legrand 2006; 2007).”
Musical creativity and the embodied mind (2018, neutral): “…perspectives reveal that musical creativity is deeply dependent on our bodily power of action and unfolds in terms of motor possibilities (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007).6 It is also important to note that several authors have discussed the “primacy of the body” even in seemingly passive…”
‘Oh, was that “experiential learning”?!’ Spaces, synergies and surprises with Kolb’s learning cycle (2016, background): “The body is more than the subject or object of experience; it is a principle of experience (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008).”
Playing together without communicating? A pre-reflective and enactive account of joint musical performance (2015, neutral): “…(Clark, 1997), intersubjectivity (De Jaegher 2009; Gallese, 2001), neurophenomenology (Varela, Rosch, & Thompson, 1991), and philosophy of mind (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Hutto & Myin, 2013; Rowlands, 1999) together constitute an impressive amount of evidence leading towards a post-Cartesian…”
The Interview: Data Collection in Descriptive Phenomenological Human Scientific Research* (2012, neutral): “" (Giorgi, 2009; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Nagel, From a phenomenological perspective there is not a " who " in the same sense that there is a " what " , making some of the reasoning in mainstream psychological research questionable to begin with.”
Place attachment: How far have we come in the last 40 years? (2011, neutral): ““ What we see and hear and touch and taste and smell (or avoid smelling) is shaped by what we do and what we are capable of doing e our pragmatic possibilities and the sensorimotor capacities of our bodies ” (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, p. 98).”
Sociality and the life–mind continuity thesis (2009, methodology): “…there is a growing recognition of the importance of a phenomenologically informed approach to intersubjectivity for the cognitive sciences (e.g., Gallagher and Zahavi 2008; Gallagher 2008a; Zahavi 2001, 2005) and the enactive approach in particular (e.g., Thompson 2001, 2007), these are only…”
Enactive artificial intelligence: Investigating the systemic organization of life and mind (2009, background): “Furthermore, embodied AI is now widely considered to avoid or successfully address many of the fundamental problems encountered by traditional “Good Old-Fashioned AI” (Haugeland 1985), i.e. ‘classical’ problems such as those pointed out in Searle’s (1980) famous “Chinese Room Argument”, the notoriou”
In Defense of Phenomenological Approaches to Social Cognition: Interacting with the Critics (2012, neutral): “(2010); Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009); Gallagher (2001, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008); Gallagher and Hutto (2008); Gallagher and Zahavi (2008); Hutto (2008; Hobson (1993); Ratcliffe (2007); Reddy (2008); Trevarthen (1979).”