Specialized supply firms, property rights and firm boundaries

By Ashish Arora, Robert P. Merges. 2004

191 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a203eb72668d8254e040e0b184ca52a60e33bc16

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Citations in the corpus

Inventors and invention processes in Europe: Results from the PatVal-EU survey (2007, background): “As Gans et al. (2002) or Arora and Merges (2004) have noted, when property rights are strong and well enforced, new companies are more likely to start up because they can specialise in developing the technology and selling it to other firms, without incurring the much higher costs and risks of…”
Profiting from technological innovation by others: The effect of competitor patenting on firm value (2006, background): “The majority consider the challenges facing an innovator in the process of accessing and building the complementary assets necessary to innovate successfully (.e.g, Pisano 1990; Oxley 1997; Arora and Merges 2004).”
1 Moving Beyond Schumpeter: Management Research on the Determinants of Technological Innovation (2008, background): “Stronger patents, both by codifying knowledge and by mitigating expropriation threats, may encourage technology transfers (Arora and Merges, 2004) and promote division of labor in innovation (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a, 2008; Gallini 2002).”
Productivity and the Role of Complementary Assets in Firms’ Demand for Technology Innovations (2009, background): “…also increase when buyers place themselves at risk of disclosing proprietary information to rivals via prospective suppliers or are forced to pay higher-thanmarket prices for technology as a result of holdup in small-numbers bargaining (Williamson, 1985; Arora and Merges, 2004; Arora et al., 2007).”
The paradox of openness revisited: Collaborative innovation and patenting by UK innovators (2016, background): “Arora and Merges (2004) develop an analytical model in which the fear of knowledge spillovers may lead firms to internalize research even if internal research is less productive”
Ideas for rent: an overview of markets for technology (2010, background): “5 Arora and Merges (2004) argue that an independent supplier can be provided superior incentives to customize the”
The role of patent protection in (clean/green) technology transfer (2010, background): “Supporting this line of argument, Arora and Gambardella (2010) provide evidence from the chemical industry in which quick and extensive diffusion of new technologies occurred in the presence of effective patent protection.”
The paradox of openness: Appropriability, external search and collaboration (2014, background): “…largely focuses on the industry-level environment and how the presence of tight or weak appropriability regimes shapes individual firm behavior (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000; Arora and Merges, 2004), and downplays the role of managerial choice in relation to protecting innovations.”
Patents and patent policy (2007, background): “Fourth and finally, the existence and strength of the patent system affects the organization of industry, by allowing trade in knowledge, which facilitates the vertical disintegration of knowledge-based industries and the entry of new firms that possess only intangible assets (Hall and Ziedonis 2001”
The market for patents in Europe (2007, background): “…strategies on technology exchange through arms-length market transactions, strategic alliances, or crosslicensing agreements (e.g. Grindley and Teece, 1997; Rivette and Kline, 2000; Arora et al., 2001; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Arora and Merges, 2004; see also OECD, 2005, and The Economist, 2005).”
Used, Blocking and Sleeping Patents: Empirical Evidence from a Large-Scale Inventor Survey (2016, background): “Complexity The transaction-oriented view on IPR posits that intellectual property reduces transaction costs in the market for products (Arora and Merges, 2004).”