The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model

By Nickolay Gantchev. 2013

298 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cada159a66a522e2ec7eaf8d389fad980156ed96

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Zacharias Sautner
2. Song Ma
3. X. Tian
4. Laura T. Starks
5. Wei Jiang
6. I. Schindele
7. C. Ostergaard
8. Oyvind Norli

In Finance

1. Zacharias Sautner
2. Laura T. Starks
3. Song Ma
4. Wei Jiang
5. X. Tian
6. Oyvind Norli
7. I. Schindele
8. C. Ostergaard

Citations in the corpus

• ESG Shareholder Engagement and Downside Risk (2018, background): “The data on duration and meeting frequency confirm that engagement is costly for the investor, in terms of the time and resources needed to successfully close an ESG engagement (Gantchev, 2013).”
• How does hedge fund activism reshape corporate innovation? (2016, background): “It is hard to argue that they would willingly hold undiversified positions and be subject to costly engagements (Gantchev (2013)) if these were not necessary means to achieve their goals.”
• Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Empirically, Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2016) find that hedge fund activists camouflage their purchases by timing them to coincide with liquidity-driven selling by institutions.”
• Liquidity and Shareholder Activism (2015, background): “However, Gantchev (2013) documents that two-thirds of 13D-filing blockholders never go on to make any formal demands to their target. Thus, the filing of a 13D form does not imply that the filer has paid or will pay the costs of an actual intervention. A 13D filing is therefore a less suitable defin”
• Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of Passive Investors on Activism (2016, unknown): “…associated with seeking board representation and initiating a proxy fight (e.g., hiring lawyers, bankers, etc.) can amount to millions of dollars (Gantchev, 2013), while pushing for a shareholder proposal or exempt solicitation is “easier, less costly and demand a lower level of commitment from…”
• The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes (2011, unknown): “…of Financial Studies / v 28 n 10 2015 duration of ownership by Pershing Square in the Fortune Brands case described in Appendix C. Undiversified positions together with costly engagements, including proxy contests or public campaigns (Gantchev 2013), cannot be justified by pure stock picking.”
• Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study (2017, unknown): “during a (-20, 20) day window, which are similar to those reported by Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), Klein and Zur (2008), Clifford (2008), and Greenwood and Schor (2009). The European and Asian announcement returns are significant at 6.”
• Ownership, Activism and Engagement: Institutional Investors as Active Owners (2016, unknown): “…to effects of financially oriented shareholder activism on corporate policy, corporate performance, and investment performance (Becht, Franks, Grant, & Wagner, 2015; Brav et al., 2008a; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Volume 24 Number 3 May 2016 Thomas, 2008b; Filatotchev & Dotsenko, 2015; Gantchev, 2013).”