Venture Boards: Distinctive Monitoring and Implications for Firm Performance
By Shubham Garg. 2013
152 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Management of Technology and Innovation
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a160fb7dbd2e086b8f1c623bdf188ce569c97086
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Emily Cox Pahnke
- Michael Leatherbee
- G. Fisher
- Juanita González-Uribe
- Benjamin L. Hallen
- Dan J. Wang
- Herman Aguinis
- Noam Wasserman
In Management of Technology and Innovation
- Emily Cox Pahnke
- Michael Leatherbee
- G. Fisher
- Juanita González-Uribe
- Benjamin L. Hallen
- Dan J. Wang
- Herman Aguinis
- Noam Wasserman
Citations in the corpus
- The Effects of Business Accelerators on Venture Performance: Evidence from Start-Up Chile (2017, background): “Moreover, our paper offers suggestive empirical evidence to complement recent theoretical perspectives regarding the role of boards for new venture performance (Garg, 2013).”
- Using Theory Elaboration to Make Theoretical Advancements (2017, background): “…used to further analyze how CEOs and top management teams respond to organizational crises events (e.g., Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008) or how interactions between venture founders and their board of directors determine the strategic direction of entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Garg, 2013).”
- Exposed: Venture Capital, Competitor Ties, and Entrepreneurial Innovation (2014, background): “VCs also maintain intimate multiyear relationships with their portfolio companies that entail frequent interactions and communications (Garg, 2013; Sahlman, 1990).”
- The throne vs. the kingdom: Founder control and value creation in startups (2017, background): “…who haven’t raised capital from outside investors will control the entire board of directors and thus all board decisions, but will lack the “board capital” (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) that directors could contribute, and also lack the discipline that can come from their monitoring (Garg, 2013).”
- Corporate Governance Deviance (2016, unknown): “-based boards should be composed of a majority of outsiders, some pre-IPO firms operate with a majority of insider directors, thereby under-conforming with respect to the dominant governance logic (Garg, 2013).”