On Perceptions of Fairness: The Role of Valuations, Outside Options, and Information in Ultimatum Bargaining Games
By Pamela M. Schmitt. 2004
115 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5cbb7aa179766c2da2ab250278885340d4253d1f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
In Safety Research
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Nisvan Erkal
- Lisa A. Cameron
- Lata Gangadharan
- Vivi Alatas
- Colin F. Camerer
- Danila Serra
- A. Barr
Citations in the corpus
- More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature (2013, unknown): “Although the ultimatum game is asymmetric by nature, one can further increase or decrease asymmetry by introducing asymmetry in conflict payoffs, outside options to be chosen or waved before playing the game, and asymmetries in information and communication possibilities (Güth et al., 2001; Falk et ”
- Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students (2009, background): “See, for example, Cason and Noussair (2007), Schmitt (2004) , and Cason et al. (2003).”