American Interests and IMF Lending

By Thomas Oatley, Jason Yackee. 2004

215 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9f6553b614068856235621cf3e9b78e86e804a84

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Citations in the corpus

The European rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF lending to Central and Eastern European countries (2014, background): “To explain this, state-centric approaches (Broz and Hawes, 2006; Gould, 2006: chapter 5; Oatley and Yackee, 2004; Thacker, 1999) would purport that those ‘softer’ IMF policies reflected ‘national interests’ or domestic”
IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies (2006, background): “Oatley and Yackee (2004) , Stone (2002, 2004), Thacker (1999).”
IMF conditionality: theory and evidence (2008, unknown): “Closer G7 allies receive fewer program conditions (Dreher and Jensen 2007) and larger loans (Oatley and Yackee 2004; Barro and Lee 2005).”
Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the Un General Assembly? (2006, unknown): “…chance of receiving a program when moving towards the US position than a country that is closely allied with the US, but slightly moves away from it.4 Oatley and Yackee (2004) show for the period 1985-1998 that the IMF offers larger loans to closer US allies, as measured by UN voting patterns.”
“The silent revolution:” How the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending (2012, methodology): “geopolitical interests, I follow others (Broz and Hawes 2006; Oatley and Yackee 2004) in using United Nations (U.”
Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending (2010, unknown): “Studies in this vein have found that IMF loans tend to be larger when a borrower country owes large amounts of debt to private creditors—primarily commercial banks—located within the United States and other major IMF shareholders (Oatley and Yackee 2004; Broz 2005; Broz and Hawes 2006).”
Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund (2006, background): “…intervention in the economy+ Higher values denote a more conservative ideology ~Poole and Rosenthal 1997!+ 71+ See Gould 2003; Oatley 2002; and Oatley and Yackee 2004+ 72+ Exactly how banks influence IMF policy remains a topic for additional research+ Gould’s point is that international…”