Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the Un General Assembly?
By Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm. Social Science Research Network, 2006
285 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Using panel data for 188 countries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment programs and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the US, World Bank (concessional and non-concessional) loans have a significant impact, while the IMF has not. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and method of estimation.
Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2f2f021e59ce62282080e45a21eb0ac2a5cbfafc
How researchers see this paper
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In Development
- J. Vreeland
- R. Stone
- Axel Dreher
- J. Stein
- Jeffrey M. Chwieroth
- Mauro F. Guillén
- Joseph G Wright
- M. Steinwand
In Economics and Econometrics
- J. Vreeland
- R. Stone
- Axel Dreher
- Mauro F. Guillén
- Jan-Egbert Sturm
- Jeffrey M. Chwieroth
- Simone Polillo
Citations in the corpus
- IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies (2006, background): “At the level of recipient country domestic politics, 4 See, for example, Broz and Hawes (2006), Dreher and Sturm (2006), Dreher et al. (2006), Oatley and Yackee (2004), Stone (2002, 2004), Thacker (1999). governments have been known to seek out IMF conditionality to gain leverage over domestic…”
- Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending (2010, unknown): “…handful of existing studies have incorporated measures of non-US shareholders’ preferences (for example, Oatley and Yackee 2004; Broz and Hawes 2006; Dreher and Sturm 2006), these studies overlook a critical variable shaping Fund lending decisions: preference heterogeneity among these large…”
- Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis (2009, unknown): “Dreher and Sturm (2006) GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.”